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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses the questions of how to ensure safety in medical Cyber-
Physical-Human System (CPHS) development from various perspectives including (1) Sys-
tem Design for Networked Medical CPHS, (2) Safety-driven Requirement and Software
Traceability, and (3) System and Human Behavior Modeling.
For (1) System Design for Networked Medical CPHS, we present two works including fail-
safe system design for networked medical systems and a communication middleware that
provides protected communication. First, we present a system design framework to handle
medical device interoperation hazards for networked systems. The hazards include temporal
safety hazards, device interoperation hazards, and potential network failures when perform-
ing medical tasks. Second, we present a communication middleware that utilizes existing
medical knowledge to provide safe communication among system components and prevent
accidental or malicious modifications of the exchanged information. Moreover, the com-
munication middleware unifies the communication mechanisms among Statechart models,
software, and medical devices.
For (2) Safety-driven Requirement and Software Traceability, we present two works. The
first work is a safety-driven requirement traceability framework to trace safety requirements,
system design, and safety analysis. The safety-driven requirement traceability framework
provides mechanisms and algorithms that ensure the safety analysis is always up-to-date
when a requirement or a system design model changes. As such, the safety analysis can
provide the proof of system safety while the system is evolving. In the second work, we
design a requirement traceability framework for distributed systems based on information
flow. The requirement traceability framework traces the exchanged information across soft-
ware artifacts written in different forms such as Statechart or object-oriented programming
languages. The framework also manages changes in the exchanged information and provides
the impact analysis algorithms to detect impacted system components and requirements in
the systems.
For (3) System and Human Behavior Modeling, we developed a set of common preventable
medical errors severed to guide the design, model, and verification of a medical CPHS.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Safety is an essential aspect to consider when designing a medical Cyber-Physical-Human
System (CPHS). Due to its natures as a life-critical system, an unaddressed safety issue may
result in mission failures or, even worse, loss of a patient’s life. For example, in a tracheotomy
system with a network connected ventilator and laser scalpel, the failure of resuming oxygen
supply after the surgery due to communication delay or network failures may result in
hypoxia to the patient. Another example, during the medical system development, a safety
analysis such as fault-tree analysis [1] serves as a proof of system safety. However, throughout
the evolution of many artifacts such as requirements, system design, and safety analysis,
these artifacts may not reflect the actual systems and the safety analysis fails as proof of
safety. These research problems become ever challenging in the use of modern technologies
such as wireless networks and distributed systems.
We tackle the safety issues in CPHS design and development including three themes in-
cluding (1) System Design for Networked Medical CPHS, (2) Safety-driven Requirement and
Software Traceability, and (3) System and Human Behavior Modeling. There are research
challenges on each theme, and we present our proposed solutions to tackle these problems.
Figure 1.1 shows the three themes and research works presented in this dissertation.
System and Human Behavior Modeling
System Design for Networked Medical CPHS
Safety-driven Requirement and Software Traceability
Systematic Modeling Medical Guidance Systems with 
Preventable Medical Errors
Medical Device Interoperation Hazards in 
Networked Medical CPHS
Pathophysiology Guided Communication Middleware for 
Medical CPHS
A Safety-Driven Requirement Traceability Framework on 
Device Interoperation Hazards
Building Traceability for Heterogeneous Artifacts in 
Medical CPHS Development Environment
Towards Cross-Layer Safety in 
Medical Cyber-Physical-Human Systems (CPHS) Development
Figure 1.1: The three major themes and individual work of each theme.
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1.1 SYSTEM DESIGN FOR NETWORKED MEDICAL CPHS
There are two works in the (1) System Design for Networked Medical CPHS theme includ-
ing a fail-safe system design for network connected medical systems [2] and a communication
middleware designed for workflow-based medical guidance and navigation systems (hereafter,
medical guidance system), a system that guides medical staff according to credible medical
knowledge.
In a networked supervisory medical system such as Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP)
[3], it requires a centralized supervisor to coordinate device interactions through networks.
With communication or devices could fail at any point of time, the control loop to ensure
safety becomes open. As such, this problem is also called as an open-loop safe problem. These
human-device interactions usually involve timing constraints such as the timing constraint
of short pausing oxygen supply to the patient to avoid hypoxia. Another type of constraint
is device interactions. For example, in the tracheotomy, while the SpO2 level, an estimated
oxygen level in the blood, is too high or the ventilator is supplying oxygen to the patient,
if the laser scalpel is emitting the laser, it will cause a surgical fire that is considered as a
significant surgery accident.
Kim et al. [4] and Tan et al. [5, 6] try to solve the open-loop safe problems from different
perspectives. Kim et al. propose a solution that the centralized supervisor sends out a vector
including a list of future actions for a device. A device performs the actions specified in the
vector when communication fails. Tan et al. propose a design pattern to tackle the open-loop
safe problem and use formal methods to prove that the proposed design pattern is correct.
A common assumption is that a system needs to be formalized as suggested by the paper to
deliver the safety guarantee. However, it is not known that given a system model whether the
system may be communication failure resistant or not. More specially, the increasing number
of medical devices will result in more complex interlaced safety constraints and make it even
more difficult to determine whether the system can safely operate under communication
failures.
To address the open-loop safe problem, we develop a system architecture and protocols
that can ensure a networked supervisory medical system satisfies timing and interaction
safety requirements. In this system, we first collect the system states composed by individual
device state and the desired safety requirements. With the system states and safety require-
ments as inputs, the protocols evaluate whether a system with multiple medical devices can
meet its safety requirements during a network communication failure. The protocols also
suggest a safe operation sequence for each medical device that the medical tasks such as
surgery can be performed safely and effectively from the system perspective.
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The second work in the system design for the safety theme is that we present a message-
oriented middleware that tightly integrates the Statechart simulation environment with pe-
ripheral software for a medical guidance system. There are two currently existing challenges
motivate the work. First, using the event-driven communication approach between regions
with different priorities in a Statechart model is not feasible. Because the event raised by
a lower priority region in a Statechart model intended to be consumed by a higher priority
region will be eliminated by the simulation environment at the end of the simulation cycle.
In other words, only regions with higher priorities can raise an event for communication with
regions with lower priorities. This limitation is not a problem in tradition signal processing
and control systems where information flow from sensors to signal processing, control and
then actuator within a cycle. However, the information flow due to organ interactions is a
complex graph.
Within YAKINDU Statechart Tools [7], the approach to get around this restriction is to use
a set of shared variables to exchange information between regions with different priorities in
a cycle-based simulation environment. However, extensive use of globally shared variables to
exchange data between YADINDU regions (modules) violates the data encapsulation design
for data protection and makes the traceability analysis difficult. In life critical medical
applications, an incorrect modification could lead to a harmful decision to the patient. The
use of globally shared variables also makes it hard to verify whether the information flow
between states adheres to medical requirements.
Our solution is to use a customized form of the Publish and Subscribe (Pub/Sub) com-
munication pattern that is (1) consistent with the interaction of human physiology and (2)
backward compatible with the YAKINDUs cycle based execution. It is important to note
that simply using a messaging broker with the Publish and Subscribe (Pub/Sub) commu-
nication pattern as in the previous work [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] to exchange
the information does not solve all the problems mentioned above. First, using Publish and
Subscribe (Pub/Sub) communication does not entirely remove the use of shared variables.
A developer may still need to temporarily store the received information into a local variable
and use the local variable later. Second, it does not address the problem that the same in-
formation with different values (i.e., different freshness of the data) could arrive on the same
simulation execution cycle. This could cause the use of inconsistent values of an information
source. Third, it does not solve the problem of lack of data protection in the simulation
environment which may be accidentally modified due to the lack of support of variable
scopes. As such, we need an integrated communication framework for both Statechart mod-
els and peripheral software that can protect against accidental data modification during
the development or at runtime to ensure data integrity. Furthermore, the communication
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framework needs to be context-independent to incorporate the different disease models and
the progression of the diseases and integrate with the Statechart simulation environment.
We present a communication framework named Middleware for Statechart and Software
(Moss) using the Pub/Sub communication pattern between Statechart model in the simula-
tion environments and peripheral software that interacts with the Statechart. Moss is also
designed to support the use in the Statechart simulation environment where the middleware
provides fast read access to the shared and protected medical data and hence does not sac-
rifice the performance of the simulation. With the communication for exchanging medical
data goes through the proposed middleware service, the medical data is protected and would
not be modified by unauthorized publishers nor received by unauthorized subscribers. Fur-
thermore, regions in a Statechart model can communicate through Moss regardless of each
region’s priority.
1.2 SAFETY-DRIVEN REQUIREMENT AND SOFTWARE TRACEABILITY
In the (2) Safety-driven Requirement and Software Traceability theme, we discuss issues re-
garding requirement and software traceability when developing a medical CPHS. We present
two research works in the requirement and software traceability theme. First, we develop a
framework named SafeTrace [18] that integrates the traceability among requirements, safety
analysis, and system design artifacts. Furthermore, we present Trapas, a requirement trace-
ability framework for Pub/Sub-based distributed systems, designed for use in distributed
systems for medical applications.
Providing requirement traceability among artifacts is a mandatory requirement from FDA
and other standards such as IEC 62304 [19] when developing a medical system. However,
without tracing safety analysis brings blind spots to system safety proof. Because the safety
analysis may not reflect the impact of requirement changes or system design changes.
Many studies have examined how to integrate safety analysis into traceability research.
One such approach [20, 21, 22, 23] leverages model-based development so that system models
can generate safety analysis automatically; examples of this include Fault-Tree Analysis
(FTA) [1] and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [24]. However, the imperfect
process of translation from system models to safety analysis can cause blind spots in impact
analysis. Moreover, most existing impact-analysis work provides information about the
affected areas in artifacts but does not indicate whether or not an upstream artifact change
(e.g., a design change) causes negative impacts to downstream ones (e.g., safety analysis),
despite such information being crucial for safety analysis. Furthermore, an intuitive approach
to avoid the safety analysis from becoming outdated is to flag critical components when a
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change is made to the component in safety critical system development. However, this is
only necessary but insufficient for medical systems that require device interactions to provide
correct services. Because configurations of medical devices will be changed due to device
interactions and the configurations themselves can create safety hazards with no change to
safety-critical medical devices (Class III medical devices).
Commercial tools such as IBM Rational DOORS [25], Yakindu Traceability [26], and
Intland codeBeamer [27], are effective tools to support traceability for general use, but, they
do not and do not need to meet the FDA requirements of safety analysis when used to
develop non-medical systems. Even though some tools (e.g., codeBeamer) support safety
analysis such as Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) [24], the trace links are at a relatively
higher level and lack a more fine-grained control of trace links. Other tools, such as the
TraceLab [28], are a test-bed for instrumenting trace links and not designed for project
management. The SafeTrace is a complement to the existing tools.
We address this research gap from a safety aspect on traceability for medical device plug-
and-play systems. The SafeTrace framework enables users to know the impact of system
design and requirement changes to safety analysis. Specifically, the focus is on how to track
down the software components that need to be changed when a fault tree is updated. The
framework ensures the modified or newly created fault trees, due to the components changes,
still meet the safety requirements based on the minimum cut set generated by FTA for safety.
Then, with traceability between safety requirements, design, and safety analysis in place,
our tool for modified system design can decide whether the change can cause potential faults
based on its change-impact-analysis algorithm.
Another research challenge in the requirement and software traceability theme is that, with
the advancement in information network technology, more and more systems are designed
as a distributed system, how we can trace the medical information in a distributed system.
For example, a Sepsis guidance system has a GUI program that serves the entry point for
physicians and medical staff to enter the patient’s data or medical orders. The back-end
services that provide medical guidance utilizes data generated from various software, physical
computers, or medical devices. We need to know how we can trace the information across
different artifacts with different types including software written in modern objected-oriented
languages and Statechart models.
Research works [29, 30, 31] leverage event-based systems and the Pub/Sub communication
pattern to manage and deliver the change events. However, most works do not address
setting up traceability for systems with specific architecture. Moreover, existing work of
traceability for distributed systems lacks a unified change impact analysis such that the
impacted system components caused by an information or system change can be quickly
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identified and appropriately handled. These problems become even more challenging when
the system scales up.
We propose the Trapas framework to address such challenges in the second theme. The
Trapas framework sets up traceability based on information flow in distributed systems and
continuously and automatically maintain the trace links based on the configuration for Pub-
/Sub communication. To model the traceability, we use a tripartite graph to represent a
traceability graph for a Pub/Sub-based distributed system. This approach targets a sys-
tem that is already built with the Pub/Sub communication pattern and it does not need
significant changes to the infrastructure or system architecture. Furthermore, It provides a
lightweight mechanism to trace the information flow. Another contribution of the work is
that we propose a Change Monitor Tree Analysis (CMTA) that provides a tree-based data
structure to integrate the different types of changes and the affected components. Based on
the traceability graph and CMTA, we further present an algorithm named Change Impact
Tree Analysis (CITA) to find the impacted requirements and/or system components given
a change of attributes of the exchanged information. To further express the impact caused
by a change event, we use a tree structure in CITA to represent the change impact. Both
generated graph representation of traceability for a change event and its impact propaga-
tion help to explore the impacted requirements and software components such that one can
declare that a modification made to the exchanged information of a requirement and the
impacted artifacts are handled completely and safely.
1.3 SYSTEM AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR MODELING
In the last theme (3) System and Human Behavior Modeling, we develop a modeling
framework for medical guidance systems with a set of safety properties derived from common
preventable medical errors. To facilitate the system design and ensure the system and its
interactions with humans will meet the specified safety requirements, system designers use
the system modeling tool such as UPPAAL [32] to model the system and validate the system
model whether the system behaviors may violate the safety properties in the simulations
environment.
For such life-critical medical CPHS, it is important to formally verify the design of the
system to ensure reliability and safety. In this way, we can detect and avoid the system
design flaws at an early stage. For a medical CPHS, there are a few research challenges
to produce a comprehensive model for verification, due to the complex interactions among
humans and computer guidance systems, and the medical best practice guidelines. First,
a series of medical related design objectives are needed when designing a medical CPHS.
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Second, an integrated framework to systematically model the devices, best practice guidance,
human behavior and their interactions with the examination of the design objectives is also
needed
There are a few research works related to the methodology for verification of human
interaction and system design [33, 34]. The work [33] focuses on reusing the medical devices
model. The work also takes the layers approach to model the system and interactions.
Our work has similar advantages to the reuse of modeling. The research work [34], based
on the extended operator function model (EOFM), provides a framework to model the
human-machine interactions. This work provides an automatic translation from EOFM to
Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [35] and verifies the specified properties with SAL.
These frameworks work well in their domain and target systems; however, how to design
and validate the system of medical guidance systems with humans in the loop to prevent
potential medical errors remains unclear.
In this work, we focus on providing a set of medical human intellectual tasks [36, 37],
as design guidelines and an integrated modeling framework for main components contained
in a medical CPHS. Violations of the specified tasks may fall into the proposed human
intellectual task categories. The integrated modeling framework is based on timed automata
and includes device models, human models, medical best practice models, and interaction
models. Our goal is to use UPPAAL [32] to exam whether the system prevents the medical
errors and meets the design requirements, and find out potential design improvement, based
on integrated system models and human-intellectual-tasks-driven properties for verification.
We organize the following chapters as follow. For the System Design for Networked Medical
CPHS theme, we discuss the two works including open-loop safe systems and the Moss
communication middleware for medical CPHS in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively. We
present the two works in the Safety-driven Requirement and Software Traceability theme,
SafeTrace and Trapas, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively. We present user feedback
of using Trapas in Appendix A. For the System and Human Behavior Modeling theme, we
present the integrated modeling framework with human intellectual tasks and preventable
medical errors in Chapter 6. Finally, we conclude this dissertation in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2: MEDICAL DEVICE INTEROPERATION HAZARDS IN
NETWORKED MEDICAL CPHS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In a network connected medical CPHS, networks provide communication among medical
devices. It also allows the possibility of configuration and combinations of medical devices
for different medical procedures. However, within the network environment, a medical CPHS
needs to deal with the situation when the networks do not provide services which will impact
the safety and effectiveness of medical procedures.
One of the most important issues when using wireless networks for medical CPHS is that
failures or glitches of the communication networks should not lead to negative impacts on
the patient as well as the medical procedures. This problem is known as the “open-loop”
problem because the supervisory control loop becomes open if the communication networks
fail. In another case, even if the communication networks do not fail but suffer from a
long and unexpected delay, it may cause adverse impacts to the system. For example, in
Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) framework [3], if the supervisor cannot query the
state of the devices due to communication loss, the supervisor will not be able to decide
the following actions for each device without the state information of each device. For this
case, medical devices cannot further coordinate because of lacking communications networks.
Without further coordination, the system may violate the predefined safety constraints and
hence brings the patient to a dangerous situation. As a result, it is required to handle the
situation when the communications network may fail without compromising the patient’s
safety.
Kim et al. [4] and Tan et al. [5, 6] did the pioneering work on open-loop safe problems
from different perspectives. Kim et al. propose a vector-based solution that the centralized
supervisor sends out a vector including a list of future actions for the device. A device
performs the actions specified in the vector when the communication fails. Tan et al. propose
a design pattern to tackle the open-loop safe problem and use formal methods to prove that
the proposed design pattern is correct. A common assumption is that the system needs to
be formalized as suggested by the papers to deliver the safety guarantee. However, it is
not known that given a system model whether the system may be communication failure
resistant or not. This is especially important because of the increasing number of devices of
generic medical scenarios and the dynamic random failure mode of wireless communication
bringing new challenges to the open-loop safe problem. More specially, the increasing number
of medical devices will result in more complex interlaced safety constraints and make it even
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more difficult to determine whether the system can safely operate under communication
failures.
In this chapter, we present algorithms for medical CPHS to determine whether the system
can guarantee safe system state transitions in the presence of communication failures. First,
we analyze a medical system of Tracheotomy and the safety constraints for the patient.
Based on the medical scenario, we provide a formal representation of a medical system.
With the system models, we propose an algorithm to analyze the system models to determine
whether the system can safely transit among system states and can handle the situation of
communication failures or suffering from a long communication delay. Furthermore, if there
exist multiple possible system state transitions, we propose an algorithm to select the path
with the longest period that allows medical personnel to perform medical operations.
To evaluate the proposed solution to the open-loop safe problem, we provide a case study
with multiple devices and a set of safety requirements to examine the proposed path finding
algorithm on the Tracheotomy systems to find the configuration of the system to operate
safely. The results show that the resulting system with the generated configuration and pre-
defined safety constraints can safely perform system state transitions under communication
failures.
Overall, our major contributions in tackling the open-loop safe problem in medical cyber-
physical-human systems are to determine whether a system could be open-loop safe, and,
if the system could be open-loop safe, what could be the configuration of the system that
allows medical personnel to perform medical services.
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows: We derive the safety hazards
and the fault model of the Tracheotomy in Section 2.2. The open-loop safe cyber-physical
medical system is introduced and formalized in Section 2.3. The algorithms to determine
the system whether it is open-loop safe is presented in Section 2.4. A case study of the
algorithms for the extended Tracheotomy scenario and generic medical system setting is
presented in Section 2.5. We present the related work in Section 2.6 and conclude the
chapter in Section 2.7.
2.2 MEDICAL CPHS AND MEDICAL SCENARIOS
We present a motivation system architecture based on MD PnP. Then, we present the
Tracheotomy as a motivation example that adapts MD PnP for the supervisory control




















Figure 2.1: The architecture of an open-loop safe medical CPHS, where we integrate the
Open-Loop Safe Protocol into the legacy supervisory control architecture of medical
systems (e.g., OpenICE [38]).
2.2.1 System Architecture
The motivated supervisory control architecture is similar to the Open-source Integrated
Clinical Environment (OpenICE) [38]. Figure 2.1 depicts the architecture for the supervisory
control systems. OpenICE is developed by the MD PnP program. The main goal of OpenICE
is to connect network nodes (e.g., medical devices, decision support system) of medical
systems in the medical environment.
As presented in Figure 2.1, we define two roles of devices in an open-loop safe medical
cyber-physical human system (OLSSystem), an Open-Loop Safe Supervisor (OLS-Supervisor)
and an Open-Loop Safe Client (OLS-Client). In an OLSSystem, there exists only one OLS-
Supervisor and at least one OLS-Client. The setting is similar to OpenICE architecture that
consists of one supervisor and multiple device adapters.
The OLS-Supervisor is designed to coordinate the medical devices to deliver medical
services. It is the center of the control logic. The system designers can specify how the
system should transit between different system states in the OLS-Supervisor. For example,
the OLS-Supervisor in the Tracheotomy can regulate the oxygen supply to avoid the patient
suffering hypoxia.
On the other hand, an OLS-Client is an adapter that receives, reads, and executes the
control commands from the OLS-Supervisor through the communication networks to ac-
tuate medical devices. An OLS-Client is a middle layer serves as an interface between the
OLS-Supervisor and a medical device. For example, if an OLS-Client receives a command to
resume the oxygen supply from the OLS-Supervisor, the OLS-Client then performs the desig-
10
nated actions to resupply oxygen in the ventilator. Here, the goal is to simplify functionality
in OLS-Client adapters in order to decrease the state space and hence the complexity in a
distributed environment.
2.2.2 Airway Laser Tracheotomy
In the Tracheotomy, a surgeon first needs to stop the oxygen flow of the ventilator to
the patient with a mask on, and supply plain air flow to the patient. Then, the surgeon
operates a laser scalpel to unblock the airway of the patient. During the surgery, there are
two safety requirements. First, the surgery should have no fire accident. That is, the laser
scalpel should only operate on the patient when the ventilator is not supplying oxygen but
plain air. It implies that the ventilator should be configured to stop the oxygen prior using
laser scalpel. Second, the patient should not suffer from hypoxia because of the late oxygen
resupply. It implies that the oxygen should resupply in time to avoid hypoxia, and the laser
scalpel operations should finish before the oxygen resupply or it will cause a surgical fire.
Without an integrated medical system for such medical scenarios to coordinate multiple
medical devices, the safety requirements are only achieved on a best-effort basis.
In the Tracheotomy, the medical system has a ventilator to supply the oxygen or plain air,
and a laser scalpel to emit laser. A detailed model is illustrated in [39, 5]. In a simplified and
yet realistic model, both the ventilator and the laser scalpel can be modeled as binary-valued
devices. A binary-valued device is a device with two status, and each status can transit to
the other status directly. For the laser scalpel, “no-operation, 0” represents it does not
emit the laser and “in-operation, 1” represents it emits the laser for operation. For the
ventilator, “in-operation, 1” represents it supplies oxygen mixed with air and “no-operation,
0” represents it supplies plain air only.
2.3 SYSTEM MODELS
We introduce a system model for an open-loop safe system. An open-loop safe system
model is a three-tuple, 〈S, SC, P〉 where S is a set of system states and each system state is
a tuple of devices’ status. For example, for a medical system with two binary-valued medical
devices, S is a set of system states s. Each system state s is an n-tuple of devices’ status
di.status where i is the i-th device in the system and status ∈ {0, 1} and n is the number
of devices.
Each system state s has a type which could be either Open-Loop Safe State (OLSState),
Transient Safe State (TSState), Operation State (OState), or UnSafe State (USState). A
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system can stay at an OLSState permanently (in comparison to transient) and safely. For
example, a patient with a ventilator supply oxygen is considered as an OLSState. A system
staying at TSState is said to be safe and only allowed in the state for a certain period of
time. Furthermore, a system staying at OState has the same properties as a TSState. The
difference is that an OState is also the destination state of a series of state transitions to let
medical personnel perform medical operations. Lastly, a system entering or staying at an
USState is unsafe which the system shall avoid entering the state in any condition.
The second element in the system model is a set of safety constraints, SC. Each sci in
SC is a two-tuple, 〈state, period〉, that allows a system staying at the given state safely for
the specified period of time. On the other hand, for an sc, if the specified period of time is
zero, it means that the system is not safe in the given state.
The third element in the system model is a set of open-loop safe paths, P . For each open-
loop safe path p ∈ P , p has a source state, a destination state and a series intermediate states
between the source and the destination state. The source state of p is an OLSState and the
destination state is an OState. After the system reaches the destination state, the system
will reside in the OState safely for a period of time which allows medical operations, then the
system follows the reverse path and transits to the original source state. The intermediate
states on a path are a series of TSState. Furthermore, a path should not have any USState.
Any state transition between two immediate states should have state distance one. Here,
we assume that, in a unit of time, the system should only transit to another state with
distance one. For example, in a two-binary-valued-devices system, a transition from a state
(0, 1) to (1, 1) has the state distance one and it takes one unit of time to transit. Because
it only requires the first device in the tuple to change the status from zero to one and the
status of the second device remains unchanged. Furthermore, a transition from a state (0, 1)
to (1, 0) has the state distance two and it takes two units of time. Because it requires each
device to change its status and each change of status requires one unit of time.
2.4 FINDING AN OPEN-LOOP SAFE SYSTEM
In this section, we first present an algorithm to examine whether a given system model
is open-loop safe and find out possible open-loop safe paths in a given set of system states
and safety constraints. After finding out possible open-loop safe paths, if there are multiple
open-loop safe paths in the system, we present an algorithm to select an open-loop safe path




































Figure 2.2: Workflow for open-loop safe system development
2.4.1 Determining an open-loop safe system
The first question to ask is whether there exist one or more open-loop safe paths in a
given medical system model. Because an open-loop safe path is a fundamental component
that can ensure that the system remains open-loop safe while transitioning between states
in the presence of communication failures. As such, by following an open-loop safe path, it
guarantees that the system transitions meet the safety constraints.
Figure 2.2 presents the workflow toward developing an open-loop safe system. The work-
flow includes two phases. First, with the system parameters listed in Figure 2.2, Phase I is
to decide the existence of an open-loop safe path given a system model, safety constraints,
and the objection state. If there exists at least one open-loop safe path, then we move to
Phase II. Phase II is to find out the path that can allow a system to stay for the longest pe-
riod at an operation state to perform the medical task. With the configurations for medical
devices generated in Phase II, a developer then configures the devices to transit safely and
against communication failures. Here, we focus on Phase I of the workflow. We will return
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to introduce the second phase in Section 2.4.2.
In Phase I, the first step is to construct an undirected weighted graph based on the
given system states and safety constraints. With the graph, next, we use the shortest path
algorithm to find out the shortest path and compare the length of the path with the state
distance between the source and the destination state.
Constructing a System Graph Algorithm 2.1 presents Phase I. We first construct a
graph based on the given system states and safety constraints in L:4 (Line 4 in Algorithm 2.1)
with the given system model. A system graph G is a graph representation of a system that
incorporates with system states, system state types, and safety constraints as defined in
Section 2.3. We name the graph, system graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of system states
in the given system model M and represents a set of vertexes in G, and E is a set of weighted
and undirected edges in G. Each vertex v ∈ V in the system graph G represents a relative
system state in a given system model M . After labeling each vertex with the corresponding
system state, we connect the two adjacent vertexes that have state distance one. As a result,
for every v ∈ V in G, each vertex only connects to its adjacent vertex(es) with state distance
one. Next, we set up the state type of each vertex according to its system state in L:5.
To assign an integer weight of an edge, we label the weight of each edge eij ∈ E based
on the state type of the two connecting vertexes vi, vj ∈ V and the safety constraints in
L:6. The intuition of labeling edges with different weight is that we will use this weighted
graph as the input for the algorithm to find the path with maximum allowable time in the
operation state. For each edge e, we assign either one of infinite to the weight of each edge.
More specifically, for each vertex v labeled with USState, we label the weight of each edge
connecting to the vertex v with infinite weight. For any other edges in the graph, we label
the weight of the edge with one. Since only unsafe transitions to or from a vertex v labeled
with USState have infinite weight, the weighted shortest path algorithm avoids selecting
these edges. To this end, we finish constructing a system graph of a given system. We are
ready to use this system graph as an input for the weighted shortest path algorithm to find
out open-loop safe paths.
Finding Open-Loop Safe Paths With the generated system graph, we use the weighted
shortest path algorithm to find out the shortest path from the source state, i.e., an open-loop
safe state, to the destination vertex, i.e., an operation state. This step is presented in L:7
in Algorithm 2.1. Since we have labeled all the edges connected to each unsafe state vertex
with infinite weight, and all other edges with weight one, when the shortest path algorithm
selects an edge, it attempts to select the edge with weight one which avoids selecting the
edges connected to the unsafe state vertexes.
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Assume that the algorithm finds only one shortest path in a given system graph. After the
algorithm finds out the shortest path, we then compare the summation of weights along the
path with the state distance between the source and the destination state in L:8. Since the
weight of each edge is not unique, so there could be multiple paths with the same weight. We
will discuss the case if there are multiple paths in a system shortly. On the other hand, if the
total weight of the found path is larger than the state distance between the two states, then
it means the algorithm selects more edges than necessary to transit from the source state
to the destination state. Therefore, we can conclude that there does not exist an open-loop
safe path in the given system model.
Furthermore, the total weight of the found path will never be smaller than the state
distance between the two states because the state distance between the two states is a
minimum number of required state change. So, with the given graph, the minimum weight
of a path for a source state to reach the destination state is as the same as the state distance
between the two states.
Finally, if the summation of the found path weight has the same state distance between
the two states, then it means the algorithm selects the shortest path between the source
state and the destination state. We can proceed to the next step to find out the period of
time for each device to stay at a certain status.
As mentioned earlier, the algorithm may find out more than one path with the same weight
between the source and the destination states. For example, when the algorithm selects one
of two outgoing edges of a vertex. If the two outgoing edges have the equal weight one, then
the algorithm might select either one of them. In this case, we need to determine which
one of the found paths may have the longest period to stay at the operation state which
allows more time for medical personnel to perform medical tasks. In the next section, we
will introduce the algorithm to select the path of interest.
2.4.2 Finding Open-Loop Safe Path(s) with Maximum Duration in an Operation State
With the definition of transient safe in Section 2.3, we can now define a transient safe
period (TSP). TSP is a period of time that a device can stay at a certain status so that
the whole system remains temporarily safe. A TSP for a device can be configured as a
timer by an OLS-Client adapter so that the adapter on the medical device can change the
device’s status when the timer starts and resume the device’s status after the timer with
TSP configured expires.
We start from calculating the TSP configurations for the ventilator and the laser scale
in the Tracheotomy as a motivation example. After that, we will generalize the algorithm
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Algorithm 2.1: Determine if a system has one or more open-loop safe path(s)
1 Input: States S and safety constraints SC of the system model M ;
2 Output: List of possible system transition paths;
3 begin
4 System graph G = (V,E) ← setSystemGraphVertex(M.states);
5 G ← G.setVertexType(M.states.types);
6 G ← G.setEdgeWeight();
7 M.paths ← G.getShortestPath(M.safetyConstraints);
8 M.paths ← removePathWithWeightLargerThanStateDistance (sourceState,
destinationState, M.paths);
9 if Size of M.paths equals zero then
10 return No path found;
11 else
12 return M.paths;
for period configurations for multiple devices. With the found path from Algorithm 2.1, we
can find the TSP on each device according to the specified safety constraints. If there are
multiple paths, after finding out the period of each timer on one path, we then sort the paths
in non-increasing order of the period that the system can stay in an operation state. We
choose the path with the longest period that the system can stay in an operation state.
Figure 2.3 presents the found path transitioning from an OLSState through a TSState
to an OState and rolling back to the same OLSState. The ventilator is the first device to
change its status. Assuming the safety constraint on ventilator suggests the safe period of
pausing oxygen supply is pvent.off.max. The safe period for the ventilator pausing oxygen
supply is dvent.off.timer = dvent.off.max. The ventilator remains off (i.e., 0) from tv to tv′ and
changes its status to on (i.e., 1) at tv′ .
The laser scalpel is the second device to change its status, and we need to configure the
timer for the laser scalpel such that it does not violate the safety constraint causing a surgical
fire. Assume each state transition takes the maximum duration dtran and the system resides
in a TSState for the maximum duration dresd. From Figure 2.3, we derive the safe duration
to avoid hypoxia is below.
2 · 2dtran + 2 · dresd + dops ≤ dvent.off.max (2.1)
And we can derive the maximum safe period dops for the laser scalpel operation


































Figure 2.3: Time progression of system state transitions for the extended Tracheotomy
scenario
As such, the TPS for the laser scalpel operations is
dlaser.on.timer = dops + 2dtran (2.3)
= dvent.off.max − 2(dtran + dresd) (2.4)
The timer for the laser starts at the ime tl and fires at tl′ .
And since dvent.off.timer = dvent.off.max, we can further derive dvent.off.timer as:
dlaser.on.timer = dvent.off.timer − 2(dtran + dresd) (2.5)
In the above mentioned example, the duration of the laser timer dlaser.on.timer is limited by
the duration of ventilator dvent.off.timer to resume the oxygen.
We further extend this example to add another safety constraint that limits the continuous
operation time of the laser scalpel to protect the medical device. The maximum duration
for the laser scalpel to operation is given as dlaser.on.max. As such, the duration for the laser
timer in Equation 2.5 is as follows.
dlaser.on.timer = min(dvent.off.timer − 2 · 2dtran − 2 · dresd,
dlaser.on.max)
(2.6)
Specifically, we present the algorithm of finding the TPS for each device in Algorithm 2.2.
The idea is that we gradually shrink the timer duration of each device along a path. If a
device also has a safety constraint specifying the limited period of time staying in a certain
status, then we take it into account when calculating the TSP for the device. First, after
running Algorithm 2.1 mentioned above, we retrieve pathCandidates from the system model
M in L:4 in Algorithm 2.2. For each path in the pathCandidates, the algorithm extracts the
devices that need to change its status. As mentioned earlier, in each unit of time, there is
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Algorithm 2.2: Finding an open-loop safe path with the longest duration in the
operation state
1 Input: A system model M = 〈States, SafetyConstraints(SC), Paths〉 with the paths
generated from Algorithm 2.1
2 Output: An open-loop safe path
3 begin
4 pathCandidates ← M.Paths;
5 constant dtran, dresd duration for transitioning and residing;
6 for each path p in pathCandidates do
7 deviceList ← getDevicesToBeConfigured(p);
8 for each device mi in deviceList do
9 /* Shrink the timer duration from the previous device */
10 if mi has safe operation time constraint in M.SC OR
11 mi−1 has the timer configured then
12 timer duration dmi ← min( dmi−1 − 2(dtran + dresd), maximum safe duration
on mi specified in M.SC);
13 mi.setTimer(dmi);
14 else
15 mark mi as unhandled ;
16 i+ +; /* Move to the next device */
17 /* Reversely expand the timer duration from the next device, starting from mi
where it is immediate preceding to the first device has timer configured */
18 for each device mi marked as unhandled in deviceList do
19 dmi ← dmi+1 + 2(dtran + dresd);
20 mi.setTimer(dmi);
21 i−−; /* Move to the previous device */
22 dops ← dlastDeviceWithT imerConfigured − 2dtran ;
23 p.add(dops) ;
24 sortPathsByDurationInOperationState(pathCandidates);
25 return the path with largest dops;
only one device which changes its status. So, for each path in the pathCandidates, we can
retrieve an ordered list of devices where each device will change its status sequentially as in
L:7.
We present the TPS configurations from L:8 to L:23 in Algorithm 2.2. First, if a device
has a safety constraint specified in the system model or the preceding device has the timer
configured, then we calculate the TSP for the current device. Otherwise, we mark the device
as unhandled and will handle it later in L:18. For the current device, set the TSP of the device
to the minimum of the safe period to stay at its current status from the safety constraint,
or the timer duration from the previous device, dmi−1, minus the two transitioning time and
residing time, 2(dtran+dresd). To see that why we need to subtract the the two transitioning
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time and residing time, Figure 2.3 gives the visual illustration. Each system transition to
a state takes one transitioning time (dtran) and one residing time (dresd) at the other state.
For example, the timer duration for the laser scalpel is dtl,t′l = dtv ,t′v − 2(dtran + dresd) which
shortens the timer duration for the ventilator by 2(dtran + dresd).
To handle the device(s) that hasn’t had timer configuration yet, we handle it in L:18.
Now, assume the first i devices in the deviceList do not have its TSP calculated. We then
calculate the TSP for the i-th to the first device in the deviceList. Similar to the timing
duration shrinking in L:11, we now need to expand the TSP from the i+1-th device for the
i-th device to accommodate the two times state transition and residing time. Hence, the
timer duration dmi equals the timer configuration for the next device dmi+1 plus the two
times dtran + dresd in L:18. Then, we calculate the TSP of the i-1-th device until finish
calculating the TSP of the first device in the deviceList.
After calculating TSP for every device on the path, we then calculate the duration for
safely performing medical operation dops by subtracting the two transition time from the
TSP of the last device as described in L:22. Finally, we sort the path with non-increasing
order of the medical operation time dops in every path and return the path with the longest
medical operation time.
2.5 CASE STUDIES
We further extend the Tracheotomy example. We add another device into the existing
model to represent the ventilator supplying plain air. The new device state model s ∈ S
is a three-tuple (doxygen, dplainAir, dlaser), where the first element in the tuple represents that
oxygen is supplying when the value is one and pausing the oxygen when the value is zero. The
second element in the tuple is the status of plain air supply where the value one represents
the device is providing plain air otherwise the value is zero. The third element in the tuple
is the status of laser scalpel which has the same notion as before.
With the two original requirements of no hypoxia and no surgical fire, we add additional
two safety requirements. The first requirement is the laser scalpel can only operate safely
continuously within a period of time. The second new requirement is that once the oxygen
supply is paused, it is required to enable the plain air supply.
We list the new system states in Table 2.1. In the new system states, both USStates and
TSStates increase from one on each to three states on each. With the added system states
and the new safety requirements, we then construct the system graph in Figure 2.4 and
label the weight of each edge based on the connecting system states at two ends according
to Algorithm 2.1.
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Table 2.1: System states with types for the extended Tracheotomy scenario
State Types System states (doxygen, dplainAir, dlaser)
OLSState (1,0,0)
USState (1,1,1), (1,0,1), (1,1,0)
OState (0,1,1)





























Figure 2.4: System graph (Undirected Graph) with weighted edges, system states, and
system types for the extended Tracheotomy scenario
Next, with the system graph, we can use the path-finding algorithm in Algorithm 2.1
and TSP calculations described in Algorithm 2.2 to select a path with the longest time
staying in the OState. Figure 2.5 presents the two open-loop safe paths with the transient
safe period staying in each system state. There are two potential paths from the source
OLSState (1, 0, 0) to the destination OState(0, 1, 1). Each path has the same weight of
three. The weight equals the distance between the OLSState (1, 0, 0) and the destination
OState(0, 1, 1). The first path is P1 = (1, 0, 0) → (0, 0, 0) → (0, 1, 0) → (0, 1, 1) where
the oxygen is paused and then the plain air is supplying as shown in the top time-line in
Figure 2.5. The second path is P2 = (1, 0, 0) → (1, 1, 0) → (0, 1, 0) → (0, 1, 1) where the
oxygen supply is paused after the oxygen supply is enabled as shown in the bottom time-line
in Figure 2.5. As shown in Figure 2.5, P2 has larger dops than P1 by saving two transition
time dtran and two residing time dresd. Because, in P1, the oxygen is paused after the plain
air is enabled such that it allows more time for the system to transit to and stay at the
OState to perform surgeries.
2.6 RELATED WORK
Close-loop control systems [40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45] for medical use while ensuring safety
properties such as glucose control systems for diabetes management and patient-controlled
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Figure 2.5: The two open-loop safe paths. The top timeline is for the first path (P1) and
the bottom one is P2.
47, 48, 49]. The work [45] presents a model-driven approach for building a close-loop
cyber-physical medical system while guarantees the safety properties. In the paper [45],
Pajic et al.also discuss the failsafe design for dealing with an open-loop safe problem in
PCA when the supervisor does not receive the expected value for HR or SpO2. However,
it is not clear how the proposed method can be adapted to a system with more than one
network-connected medical device to coordinate the task and has a failsafe design against
communication failures.
With the increasing interest of adapting communication networks in medical systems,
researchers pay noticeable efforts to address the open-loop safe problem caused by commu-
nication failures [50, 4, 51, 36, 52, 53] with enhanced system architecture. For example, the
papers [4, 51] propose an architecture named Network-Aware Supervisory System (NASS)
based on the OpenICE architecture to safely integrate networked medical devices. The key
idea is to keep a copy of execution sequences in each device called a vector; the vector con-
tains a plan of the following actions performed on the device for future cycles in the case of
a network failure of packet losses. However, it is not clear how to generalize the framework
to a scenario with multiple devices and safety constraints.
Our work focuses on providing a series of open-loop safe system transitions as a founda-
tion to generalize an open-loop safe supervisory system with multiple medical devices and
incorporate safety requirements of interactions between devices. Furthermore, our proposed
algorithms aim to select a system transition path that can allow the medical personnel with
the longest operation time for performing surgeries.
2.7 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We present a workflow toward building an open-loop safe medical CPHS. Our contribution
is that the proposed solution provides a generalized solution to tackle the open-loop safe
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problem with a focus on how to ensure that medical personnel have the longest time to
perform medical tasks. Specifically, we provide an algorithm to determine whether a given
system-of-interest model could be open-loop safe in the presence of communication failures
and an algorithm to find a state transition path that has the longest duration staying at the
operation state for medical personnel to perform medical operations.
In this chapter, we do not address the question about the communication protocol between
the supervisor and medical devices. With the open-loop safe paths generated by the proposed
algorithms in this paper, we can design an open-loop safe protocol that based on the system
transition paths for networked connected medical devices to coordinate for the medical tasks.
Currently, our assumption of system state is solely based on devices’ statuses. In some
medical cases, the system model could vary because of the situation changes of the patient.
This research challenge should be addressed in future work. This chapter is published in the
research paper [2].
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CHAPTER 3: PATHOPHYSIOLOGY GUIDED COMMUNICATION
MIDDLEWARE FOR MEDICAL CPHS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
With more and more medical CPHS have been developed to improve the quality of health
care, model-driven development of medical system serves as an essential role of this trend.
For example, a best practice guidance system captures medical best practice as a workflow
in a Statechart model that can be executed by computers and provides medical guidance
for physicians as decision supports. Representing medical knowledge in a computer model is
not only viable but also eases the verification of the translated computer model against the
medical workflow in the text form [54, 55]. Although using Statechart to simulate the disease
progression and organ reactions in organ systems enables physicians to observe the behaviors
of the disease models, it also brings out the new challenges to the medical CPHS development
before we can fully utilize the model-based development for best practice guidance systems.
A medical best practice guidance systems could have a GUI peripheral program that
a physician or a nurse can read the situation awareness of the patient from the program
and give medical orders to the program. This GUI program communicates with a medical
Statechart model server which runs as a service receiving physicians or nurses’ medical orders
or lab results sent from the GUI program or measurement from the peripheral medical
devices. Then, the medical Statechart sends the medical guidance back to the GUI program
for the medical staff’s references.
Within YAKINDU Statechart Tools [7], the approach to get around this restriction is to use
a set of shared variables to exchange information between regions with different priorities in
a cycle-based simulation environment. However, extensive use of globally shared variables to
exchange data between YAKINDU regions (modules) violates the data encapsulation design
for data protection and makes the traceability analysis difficult. In life critical medical
applications, an incorrect modification could lead to the harmful decision to the patient.
The use of globally shared variables also makes it hard to verify whether the information
flow between states adheres to medical requirements.
With increasingly complicated medical knowledge over time, one significant challenge for
Statechart-based medical guidance system is that the communication between Statechart
model server and peripheral software and among regions in a Statechart model is not pro-
tected against accidental modification of the exchanged information both during the devel-
opment or at run time. Without the protection of the communication within a best practice
guidance system, it not only could degrade the integrity of the guidance system from physi-
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cians but also reduce the validness of the clinical decision support from the guidance system.
For example, the GUI program could send unauthorized lab results into the best practice
Statechart model to affect the clinical decision-making process and degrade the integrity of
the clinical decision to the patient. Furthermore, among the regions in a Statechart model,
shared variables for communication among regions could be accidentally modified due to two
reasons. First, a low priority region cannot communicate with the higher priority regions by
raising an event in a cycle-based simulation. This limitation results in the use of shared vari-
ables for communication. Second, the local variables defined in each region are not protected
due to the lack of scope support which is typically supported in object-oriented languages
such as Java or C++. For example, although variable HeartRate is defined in the Heart
region. We can still access the heart rate variable using “Heart.HeartRate” in other regions
in the YAKINDU simulation environment. In other words, a region’s local variables can be
read and wrote by any other regions.
One possible solution to address the communication problem caused by using shared vari-
ables in a cycle-based simulation is to use the Pub/Sub communication pattern to exchange
the information between an information provider and a consumer. A Pub/Sub communica-
tion pattern is essential to build a distributed system. It is important to note that simply
using a messaging broker with the Publish and Subscribe (Pub/Sub) communication pattern
as in the previous work [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] to exchange the information does
not solve all the problems mentioned above. First, using pub-sub communication does not
entirely remove the use of shared variables. A developer may still need to store the received
information into a local variable temporarily and use the local variable later. Second, it
does not address the problem that the same information with different values (i.e., the dif-
ferent freshness of the data) arrive on the same cycle so that two information consumers
may use different values in the same simulation cycle for decision making. Third, it does
not solve the problem of data which may be accidentally modified due to the lack of sup-
port of variable scopes. As such, we need an integrated communication framework for both
Statechart models and peripheral software that can protect against data modification during
the development or at runtime to ensure data integrity. Furthermore, the communication
framework needs to be context-independent to incorporate the different disease models and
the progression of the diseases and integrate with the Statechart simulation environment.
We propose Moss, a Pub/Sub-based communication middleware for software and Stat-
echart simulations environment in model-based medical CPHS. The middleware aims to
provide data protection for medical data used in the system according to medical knowledge
such as pathophysiology of deceases that specifies which clinical information is needed or
affected for different human organs. First, a developer specifies the rules of communication
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in the middleware so that the rules form fundamental protection of medical data. Second,
a developer uses a set of API provided by the middleware to exchange medical messages
between medical models and peripheral software. Third, to provide data protections at the
runtime, with the specified communication rules, the middleware validates the connections
of publishers and subscribers and published or subscribed topic against the communication
specifications.
The chapter organizes as follow. We present the motivation of building integrated com-
munication middleware for a Statechart simulation environment and peripheral software and
devices in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we present the architecture of communication mid-
dleware. In this section, we discuss the desired system properties, interactions of a system,
architecture, communication specification, and data protection, and data synchronization in
a simulation environment. We evaluate the middleware from a performance perspective in
Section 3.4. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.6.
3.2 MOTIVATION MEDICAL LIFE-CRITICAL SYSTEM EXAMPLE
We first briefly introduce the YAKINDU simulation environment which is the environment
to execute the medical Statechart models. Then, we introduce a model-based Sepsis guidance
system as our motivating example.
3.2.1 YAKINDU Statechart Simulation Environment
In the YAKINDU Statechart simulation environment, there are two semantics of simula-
tion, event-driven, and cycle-based simulation and a developer can choose either one to model
a physical system or a workflow. If we model a system in an event-driven semantics, the
resultant system could have higher complexity for verification due to combinations of system
states. In event-based semantics, it uses event notifications as a communication mechanism
between Statechart models. However, it suffers from that the event message raised by a low
priority workflow models cannot receive by the destination with higher priority in the same
simulation cycle. Moreover, in the current simulation cycle, this event message put into the
event queue, and remaining events that are already in the queue yet consumed by its higher
priority region destination will be removed before the start of the next simulation cycle. This
results in the loss of currently queued event messages, and hence, the lower priory regions
in a Statechart model cannot use event notifications to send an event message to higher
priority ones.
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The limit of event-based simulation forces us to use cycle-based simulation by using shared
variables to exchange information between regions with different priorities. However, using
shared variables also introduce another set of problems. First, using shared variables to
exchange information could degrade the integrity of the shared data. Because any regions
could modify data in the Statechart, and there is no data isolation and protection of the data
in Statechart models using shared variables. For example, “Heart.HeartRate” is a variable
defined in the heart region. It can be read in all regions. However, it can also be written
by all other regions and it means the lack of data ownership. The “.” in “Heart.HeartRate”
only specifies the regions who defines the HeartRate variable but does not specify read/write
access. Second, it may need to have a dedicated region run on the highest priority to update
all the local variables when every simulation cycle starts.
The implication of using shared variables in the YAKINDU simulation environment for
communication is that it could make shared variables accidentally be modified by the unau-
thorized regions such as a Kidney region modifies the “Heart.HeartRate” variable that sup-
posedly should only be modified by the Heart region. This could potentially introduce
significant software bugs in software development, which could adversely impact the decision-
making process in a medical guidance system and lead to casualty in the worst case.
3.2.2 A Sepsis Guidance System
Figure 3.1 shows that the major components of a medical guidance system for Sepsis.
Physicians and nurses read the current status of the patient, history of medical orders, and
medical guidance from the system. The physicians and nurses can also give medical orders




Java Software TCP link etc. TCP link
Statechart TCP link Shared Variables
Table 3.1: Current communication mechanisms for different senders and receivers without
using the communication middleware
The GUI program in Figure 3.1 then sends the current medical order or the current patient
physiological measurements such as Urine Output for Sepsis diagnosis to a medical State-
chart simulation environment. The medical Statechart simulation environment captures and
runs the disease-dependent medical Statechart model internally. With inputs from the GUI































Java Software Moss Pub/Sub Moss Pub/Sub
Statechart Moss Pub/Sub Moss Pub/Sub
Table 3.2: Using the Moss communication middleware between different senders and
receivers
represented in the Statechart model.
We focus on communication between different entity types including Statechart models
and software written other programming language such as Java. Table 3.1 shows the existing
communication mechanisms between a different sender and receiver pair. Communication
between Java software and between Statechart models and Java software is using TCP/IP
link. Communication between Statechart models is using shared variables in the simulation
environment to exchange data. Table 3.2 shows the communication mechanisms between a
sender and receiver pair with different entity types using the Moss middleware. As we can
see from Table 3.2, the Moss communication middleware unifies communication mechanisms
between a different sender and receiver pair.
3.3 PATHOPHYSIOLOGY GUIDED COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORK
We first present an overview of the technological advancement of the pathophysiology
guided communication middleware, Moss, and the desired system properties for a medi-
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cal CPHS. Then, we present the system architecture and system components’ interactions.
Next, we present how we use pathophysiology as data protection against potentially en-
gineering flaws in a simulation environment. Finally, we describe the mechanism of data
synchronization in a Statechart simulation environment.
3.3.1 Overview of Moss communication Framework
Moss is a message-oriented middleware that focuses on providing communication and
data protection for Statechart-based medical applications. Figure 3.2 shows an example of a
guidance system for Sepsis using the Moss communication framework. The physical models,
i.e., pathophysiology model in our case, are usually derived from the domain knowledge or
experts such as physicians or nurses. We are aiming to turn the pathophysiology into the
computer executable model for communication rules in the system so that the pathophysi-
ology can be used to form the basis of medical data protection in a medical CPHS.
Moss middleware
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Figure 3.2: Moss Middleware Architecture
3.3.2 Desired System Properties
To provide a scope of the communication framework for medical CPHS, we list the desired
system properties that related to the communication. There are three categories of properties
including a) medical guided communication policies, b) ensuring data access authentication
and authorization, and c) integration with simulation environment.
In medical guided communication policies category, we need to ensure the communication
for medical operations shall adhere to the pathophysiology as the pathophysiology suggests
the valid parties to exchange medical information.
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There are a few desired communication properties to ensure that we follow the require-
ments of data access authentication and authorization in a medical guidance system. First,
we need to protect the medical information through communication by disabling private
communication between regions of Statechart and detecting violation if any. Second, there
should be access control mechanisms for the information producers and consumers. In other
words, writers can only write pre-registered information, and readers can only read pre-
registered information. Third, no global shared variable to exchange data is used in State-
chart models. Not using shared variables reduces the surface for accidental modification of
protected medical information.
The last category of property is to integrate with the Statechart simulation environment.
First, communication within the Statechart models can happen between regions regardless of
the priorities of each region. Second, the communication framework shall consider minimiz-
ing the introduced latency. Third, with the communication framework, it shall not change
the execution order of Statechart models in the simulation environment. In other words, us-
ing the communication framework should not alter the execution order of Statechart regions
during the simulation.
The proposed Moss communication framework will address each category in the following
sections.
3.3.3 System Architecture and Interactions
Figure 3.2 shows the Moss system architecture. The communication middleware sits on
top of the Transport layer and provides interfaces to clients including software programs
such as Java GUI programs and Statechart simulation environment. The core of the mid-
dleware is composed by a set of interfaces provided to the clients, a set of pathophysiology
guided communication rules for data protection, and a messaging broker that exchanges the
messages and validates the incoming communication against the communication rules.
Based on the need to integrate with the Statechart simulation environment and client
applications, the communication interfaces provided to the clients includes primitive APIs
that send and receive messages in primitive data types and custom APIs that send and
receive structured messages in a serialized format. For primitive APIs, in YAKINDU simu-
lation environment, it supports four data types including integer, real, boolean, string which
corresponding to int, double, boolean in primitive data types in Java and String class in Java
respectively. Notice that the string in the YAKINDU simulation environment corresponds
to the String class in Java, i.e., not a primitive type in Java. To exchange information
on the YAKINDU primitive data type, the user can use the middleware’s primitive APIs
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to send and receive messages from the broker. This scenario happens when the exchanged
information represented in the YAKINDU primitive types is sufficient for the application.
For example, a message with double type can be used to represent Urine Output and oxygen
saturation in the blood. As such, using the primitive APIs to send and receive messages is
sufficient for the use case.
To exchange messages in a custom and structured format, one can use the middleware’s
custom APIs to send and receive structured messages. The custom APIs provide a way to
exchange a structured message in a serialized string. The overhead of using custom APIs
would be the serialization before sending and de-serialization after receiving a custom mes-
sage. One example of using custom API to exchange structures format would be embedding
medical information such as the Urine Output of the patient with other metadata such as
a timestamp of the record and the patient ID in a custom message. The custom message
provides a more flexible way of exchanging information while ensuring the integration with
the simulation environment.
The second core component of the middleware is to provide medical data protection accord-
ing to the human pathophysiology. We will introduce each part in the second core component
in the next section. The third core component of the middleware is to integrate the integra-
tion with the messaging broker, simulation environment and peripheral application software.
We will introduce it in the following sections.
3.3.4 Pathophysiology Guided Data Protections
We cannot discuss the protection without discussing the scope of protected information.
In a Statechart simulation environment, a Statechart model would have at least one region.
We can treat a region as a Class in Java programming language. However, unlike there is
Access Modifier such as Public, Private, and Protected in Java to provide the access scope
of a class, there is no such scheme in the YAKINDU simulation environment and it raises
the problem of data protection.
We define that for an information variable, the owner of the variable is an entity and
an entity could be either a region in a Statechart model in a simulation environment or a
peripheral program that can interact with the simulation environment. To protect exchanged
information in the YAKINDU simulation environment, we first define the minimum scope of
an information variable in the simulation environment is at the region level in a Statechart
model. In other words, we can say that a region owns the information variable. However,
we cannot say a state owns the information variable because there could be many states
in a region in the Statechart model. For peripheral programs, the requirement for access
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scope is more relaxed. A peripheral program that interacts with the Statechart simulation
environment could be the owner of a data variable or the consumer of the information. In
our use case, we consider a standalone program is an entity. That is, we do not distinguish
which class or which thread has access to a piece of information.
We define the role of an entity could be a publisher and/or a subscriber, and a piece of
exchanged information is named a topic. If an entity serves as a publisher role, the entity
is allowed to publish updated information to a topic whenever the updated information
becomes available. If an entity serves as a subscriber role, the entity will receive the pushed
information of the topic from the messaging broker once the update of the topic becomes
available.
To provide data protection, the middleware captures authentication and authorization
rules in a configuration file with communication rules derived from pathophysiology. This
configuration file is loaded when initializing the Moss middleware. For authentication, a
developer specifies the attributes of each entity that could interact with the broker. The
attributes of each entity include name, access token, and an optional flag that requests the
middleware to randomly regenerate the access token each time during the broker initial-
ization. The generated random token will be stored internally and temporarily, and the
middleware will flush the token each time when an entity disconnects from the middleware.
For authorization, a user specifies the attributes of each topic including the name, the data
types, the default value, publisher name(s), the subscriber name(s), and the unit of the topic.
For example, the topic “Heart.HeartRate” represents that the information is “HeartRate”
and it is owned by “Heart” entity. The sole publisher is “Heart” which is the peripheral
ECG monitor program. The data type is “integer,” and the default value is “-1” to represent
the unknown status. A subscriber is the situation awareness program that displays the heart
rate on a monitor. The unit is “beats/minute.” The purpose of recording exchanged topic
on a configuration file is to raise the confidence to the system. Because an exchanged topic is
the potential source of errors when refactoring a distributed system for critical applications.
For example, if any other devices rather than the ECG monitor can publish a fake heart
rate to the broker, it is a severe system flaw that could compromise or degrade the services
provided by other components in the system where the other components depend on the
integrity of the heart rate information. As such, we require users to pre-plan the exchanged
information and record it in the configuration file.
During the initialization phase of the middleware, the middleware will load this configu-
ration file into the broker such that the broker is aware of the registered topics, publishers,
and subscribers. After the middleware initialization phase, the broker is up and waiting for
incoming messages. For each publisher, before a publisher can publish an update to a topic,
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it first sets up the connection to the broker with previously specified publisher name and the
token if the auto-token is disabled. When the successful connection between the publisher
and the broker, the publisher can then publish to the registered topic(s). The connection
remains open until either end terminates the connection. For each subscriber, it first sets up
a connection and opens a message listener with the broker. The message listener co-locates
with the subscriber on the same operating system. When a subscribed topic content becomes
available, the broker will actively push the topic to each message listener. A separate thread
handles this message listener. Notice that for each publisher and subscriber it requires a
separate connection with the broker.
3.3.5 Data Synchronization in Statechart Simulation Environment
The research problem of data synchronization arises naturally in the Statechart simulation
environment. In addition to removing the global shared variables for exchanging information
between entities, our design of Moss was aiming to completely remove the use of local
variables to temporarily store the information of a topic. In other words, each time a region
in a Statechart model requires a variable (i.e., a topic) to evaluate an if statement, it will
take a round trip to the broker to retrieve the updated information of such variable. However,
there are a few problems with this approach. First, it introduces a round-trip delay for each
call to the broker. Imaging that to check whether a heart rate variable is within a limited
range, we need to compare the input value with the lower threshold and the upper threshold.
This statement will introduce two times round trip delay to the broker, one for the heart rate
topic to compare with the upper bound and one for the heart rate topic to compare with the
lower bound. With the consideration of the performance simulation, we need to reduce such
delay as much as possible. Second, in an extreme case, the heart rate variable may have
different values in the same if statement due to the value is updated after the first retrieval
and before the second retrieval. It will bring the inconsistency to the logical statement and
could potentially introduce errors during simulation in a valid Statechart model which works
previously. Third, the broker could become a bottleneck during simulation, because it could
be continuously hit by each entity that requires topics from the broker. As such, the Moss
middleware cannot allow the approach of direct communicating between subscribers and
the broker without a buffering mechanism. We introduce a cache mechanism to resolve the
problems mentioned above.
We introduce a local cache per simulation environment or per peripheral program. For
example, in a system configuration of a Statechart simulation environment and a peripheral
program, there are two local caches, one for the simulation environment and one for a
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peripheral program. The simulation environment and its local cache are running on the
same machine as the same as the peripheral program and its local cache. The broker can
opt to run on different machines, and there is no restriction of where a broker shall execute.
We assume there is only one simulation environment in our system. This assumption is valid
because we can model a large system in the same simulation environment. It also reduces
the potential synchronization between multiple simulation environment instances.
Before we dive further, recall that we are referring to the cycle-based simulation environ-
ment in our context. In a cycle-based simulation environment, in a cycle, a region will take
one action, then the next lower priority region takes one action. This process repeats until
the lowest priority region finishes taking an action, the current cycle finishes, and the new
cycle begins.
:Organ Statechart :local Moss :Moss Message Broker
getMeasurement()
read variables in local cache
Get Measurement
Figure 3.3: A region in a Statechart model gets a medical measurement, lab
result, etc. from the local cache of the Moss middleware. The local Moss and its cache
reside in the same Java virtual machine. The Moss message broker is network connected.
As a result, the read operation does not introduce network traffic to the message broker as
the topic read traffic does go to the broker.
To read a topic from the broker, the objective is that all regions will see the same value
of a topic in the same cycle. It ensures that the topic is consistent for all Statechart model
in the same simulation cycle. Figure 3.3 shows the sequence diagram for a Statechart model
to read a measurement from a local cache of Moss. Here are the processes of reading a topic
from the middleware. First, in each cycle, the entity can read the currently available value
of the topic from the middleware. The middleware returns the available value from the local
cache. This step does not introduce a network delay to the broker. It is worth mentioning
that each topic’s available value remains the same in the same cycle. This design resolves
the problem of data inconsistency in the same cycle and prevents the broker from becoming
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a bottleneck being constantly hit by subscribers. For each topic, if there is an updated value
for the topic in the broker in the current cycle, the broker pushes the updated value to each
subscriber’s message listener, and the listener temporarily saves it in the local Moss cache.
Up until the end of the current cycle and after all regions finished, the middleware clears the
currently available values and sets the values in the cache as freshly available. These values
will be ready to be read at the beginning of the next cycle.
:Organ Statechart :local Moss :Moss Message Broker
sendString()




Figure 3.4: A region in a Statechart model or a peripheral software program sends a topic
of a physiological signal, an updated calculated score of a disease, a medical suggestion,
etc. to the broker through Moss. Notice that Moss does not save the topic in the local
cache during the trip to the broker. If the entity is also a subscriber of the topic, the
updated topic will be pushed back to the local cache later. (Please refer to Figure 3.5)
To send an updated value of a topic out, we take an approach similar to the write-
around cache. Figure 3.4 shows the sequence diagram of sending a message to the broker
and receiving the acknowledgment from the broker. From sending an updated value to the
broker to receiving the value from the broker takes two round trip time. Assume that an
entity serves both a publisher and a subscriber of a topic. The entity first calls the send API,
and the middleware sends out the updated value to the broker without first moving to the
data to the local cache of the middleware. When the updated values reach the broker, the
broker will immediately push the updated value of the topic to all subscribers of the topic
including the entity in our scenario. If the middleware receives the updated value in the
same current cycle, the updated value is cached in the current cycle and will be available in
the next cycle to come. However, if the middleware receives the updated value in the next
cycle, the updated value will be available in the second cycle to the current one.
For cache eviction, we only keep the latest updated value of each topic in the middleware.
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:Organ Statechart :local Moss :Moss Message Broker
notifyListner() with message mn+1
saveMessageInCache()
Push Message to the listener during cycle ci




Mark and Reset Message at the end of cycle ci
getMeasurment() during cycle ci+1
message mn+1
Figure 3.5: First, a new message mn+1 is available on the broker and pushed to each
subscriber of the topic during cycle ci where the current message mn is available during the
cycle. The message mn+1 will not be available for consumption until ci+1. At the end of
cycle ci, the Moss middleware calls Mark and Reset to remove the outdated message and
set the newly received message as read. The message mn+1 is available for organ state
machines’ consumption in cycle ci+1
Because the default cycle in the YAKINDU simulation environment is two hundred millisec-
onds, the cycle time is relatively short in comparison to medical operations in the physical
world. The typical medical operation would have time granularity of seconds or even min-
utes. It is also possible to extend the current approach to tolerate multiple values of a topic
arrives in the same cycle. One possible approach is to queue all the received requests in the
current cycle and make them available in the next simulation cycle. We notice is that it
needs to consider the queue size for each topic in the middleware such that the middleware
can handle the scenario where all arrival topic updates overflow the queue.
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3.4 EVALUATION
We present the evaluation of the communication framework. In the evaluation, we expect
to see, because of our design of the Moss framework, the response time of the sending will
be linear to the input size whereas the response time of the receiving a message will scale
regardless of the message size.
One question to ask about the framework is that what is the response time of sending a
message to and receiving a message from a broker. The longer the response time of sending
and receiving a message, the higher impact could be potentially brought to the simulation
environment. Furthermore, one of the benefits of using Moss is that removing the use of
shared medical variables in the simulation environment could potentially improve system
safety by reducing the error of medications of shared variables. However, this approach
implies many uses of getting data from the middleware for evaluating logical conditions and
calculations. We need to prove that the response time of receiving a message should scale
well regardless of the message size.
Here are the experiment setup and methodologies. We ran the experiments on a single
computer to simulate the scenario of adopting the medical guidance system in a hospital
ward. There are a producer, a consumer, and a middleware including the messaging broker.
The producer and the consumer run as separate regions in the Statechart model sequentially
in the YAKINDU simulation environment. For each simulation cycle, the producer produces
a fixed size message and sends it to the middleware first, and the consumer gets the message
of the same topic from the middleware later. We defined the response time for sending a
message is the absolute value of the period from sending the message out to the middleware
to the time receiving the acknowledgment from the middleware. Similar to the receiver, the
response time for getting a message of a particular topic is the period from the time sending
out to the time receiving a request and the time getting the data.
We benchmark the response time of sending and receiving a message versus different
message sizes ranging from 2 bytes to 1 MB with roughly a ten times message step size. We
select this size range because it covers and exceeds the message size we used in the motivation
scenarios for Sepsis guidance system. Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3 show the performance of
sending and receiving various size messages. In Figure 3.6, the X-axis represents different
message sizes with an order of magnitude step size. The Y-axis represents average response
time in microseconds with standard deviation as the error bar for each data point. For
sending, we can see that the response time grows exponentially with the message size as the
message size grows exponentially as well. For receiving, in comparison to sending a message,
the response time does not grow significantly with the increased message size than the
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2 B 1,855.56 538.92 496.58 658.09 358.72
10 B 1,857.43 538.38 496.19 648.49 355.71
100 B 1,910.46 523.43 478.53 631.58 338.51
1 KB 1,815.90 550.69 490.03 653.12 962.91
10 KB 1,440.77 694.07 590.23 775.80 1,746.68
100 KB 690.04 1,449.20 1,317.85 1,550.14 1,631.94
1 MB 112.48 8,890.50 6,432.10 8,762.77 14,852.37
Receiving
2 B 276,366.58 3.62 2.92 5.82 4.43
10 B 226,338.70 4.42 2.86 6.36 65.93
100 B 260,738.63 3.84 3.04 6.56 5.06
1 KB 280,532.42 3.56 2.84 4.91 4.01
10 KB 305,158.76 3.28 2.97 4.69 4.88
100 KB 208,201.65 4.80 4.27 5.54 3.26
1 MB 122,787.30 8.14 4.29 7.25 275.41
Table 3.3: Experimental data of response time for sending and receiving messages with
various sizes. Each message is roughly an order of magnitude larger than its previous size.
In the motivation Sepsis guidance system, the messages are all below 10 KB.
previous data point. The detailed performance metrics of sending and receiving a message
are shown in Table 3.3.
From Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3, the trend of the data matches our design of the Moss
communication framework. For sending a message, the out message goes to the broker
who has the delay caused by the underlying network environment. The delay could vary
depending on the system configurations of whether the broker resides locally or remotely.
For receiving a message, the newly available message will be actively pushed to the local
cache of the receiver side’s middleware. Since another thread handles the message delivery
to the local cache, i.e., not the tread(s) used in the simulation environment, the delivery
can happen asynchronously. The receiver can get this message in the next cycle without
introducing a round trip network delay to the messaging broker. As such, this approach
scales well even with large message size.
3.5 RELATED WORK
Middleware is an important technology that brings distributed devices and services to-
gether as a whole to provide the service to applications. With the diverse requirements
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Figure 3.6: Experiment of Sending and Receiving Messages. We adopt the standard
deviation as the error bar. The blue line with circle marks is for sending messages, and the
red line with star marks is for receiving messages. The red line is relatively closed to the
X-axis due to its relatively smaller value comparing to sending messages.
in domain-specific applications, it is an interesting research topic in many fields such as
pervasive computing, Internet of Things, wireless sensor network, and software engineer-
ing [56, 8, 9, 10].
A large body of research work in middleware for healthcare focuses on translation, trans-
mission, and interoperability of medical messaging standards such as Medical Level 7 [13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 57] and DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) is also
used by benchmarks when evaluating medical information systems.
For healthcare applications, security and privacy are one of the key consideration when
applying message-oriented middleware technology in system design. The research paper [11]
discusses how to use a Pub/Sub middleware protocol in a wireless body area network. The
motivation is that there are devices with very different designed objectives and how to use
a middleware-based approach to integrate such devices. For example, Implantable Medical
Devices (IMD) such as a pacemaker is designed to be low-power consumption and has the
limited computing power and limited communication to other devices such as the configu-
ration computer for the IMD. While personal smart devices such as smart-phones or tablets
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can serve as a gateway to collect and relay medical data from various devices to remote
health management systems. The collected data could form the basis of remote healthcare
in the future.
The research work [12] proposes policy-based information sharing on Pub/Sub middle-
ware for healthcare applications. The work provides a general policy that healthcare system
designers can use to manage the information flow in a system. Our work shares the same
requirement of providing access control of information flow. The differences are two-fold.
First, we provide a middleware to integrate the information flow with human organ models
in the Statechart environment. The access control policies address the pathophysiology and
can be evaluated by the medical professions. Second, the Statechart simulation environment
and model-based engineering become an essential role when developing a safety-critical sys-
tem. We design the Moss with the consideration of the Statechart simulation environment.
This unique capability brings the power of model-based engineering out of the simulation
environment to interface the physical application software and devices.
3.6 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We present an integrated communication framework named Moss. The major contribution
is that we design the Moss middleware with a focus on how Statechart models interact with
other software artifacts and satisfy the performance requirements in this chapter. Mainly, the
proposed communication framework provides interfaces with the focus on data integrity for
information providers and consumers. The communication rules specify typed information
topics to be exchanged between entities. Moreover, the proposed framework is designed to
eliminate the use of locally shared variables for medical information such as heart rate, urine
output, etc. in the Statechart simulation environment. This requirement prevents accidental
modifying shared medical variables where it could compromise a patient’s safety.
The evaluation results show that the response time of sending a message grows linearly
with the message sizes. This is because the message delivery from a publisher to a messaging
broker will introduce the transmission time to send the message plus a round trip network
delay. On the other hand, the time to acquire a topic from the Moss middleware’s local
cache scales well regardless of the message size. This is because an update of a topic on a
messaging broker is asynchronously pushed to the local cache of the middleware. To acquire
a topic, a consumer gets the topic directly from the local cache of the middleware, and it
results in no transmission delay of the message through networks. The requirements of the
proposed communication framework arise from the critically of a medical guidance system
designed to provide decision support. Our framework could be potentially applied to other
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areas with the need to integrate different source of information. For example, we plan to
apply the proposed communication framework to ROS (Robot Operating System), which
currently lacks the support of the information integrity in the communication middleware.
One requirement to develop a medical CPHS is to provide requirement traceability during
the system development. This ensures that system requirements are addressed and covered.
Besides, associated components of a requirement are identifiable for further refactoring of the
system. We will discuss the second theme of this dissertation, the safety-driven requirement
traceability, in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: A SAFETY-DRIVEN REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY
FRAMEWORK ON DEVICE INTEROPERATION HAZARDS FOR
MEDICAL CPHS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Unlike commercial or business software development that does not require safety analy-
sis during planning and development by certification agencies, developing medical systems
requires safety analysis and it is mandated by agencies such as the FDA or standards such
as the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI)/IEC 62304 [19]. These safety
analyses are performed to prove that the system meets the safety requirements collected
by requirement analysts from medical professionals. Moreover, each configuration of the
medical systems requires performing a safety analysis on the artifacts by following FDA
requirements. A commonly used approach for safety is Fault-Tree Analysis and its associ-
ated fault mitigation procedures. With software design changes, the safety analysis might
be out-synchronized with system design soon; hence, it might no longer reflect whether the
current software design still meets the safety requirements.
One important type of safety hazards in medical systems are interaction hazards that can
create safety hazards with no changes to existing medical devices hardware or software. For
example, in a medical environment that requires device interoperations such as the Medical
Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) Interoperability program [58], a surgical fire could be the
result of a laser scalpel emission while a ventilator is supplying oxygen. Neither of the
devices causes harm to the patient. Instead, it is the interaction of both devices that brings
harm to the involved patient. Furthermore, the failure of non-safety critical components in
an integrated clinical environment such as the OpenICE [38] of the MD PnP can lead to
critical mishaps. For example, a network router providing communication is not considered
as a safety-critical device. However, router failures can cause the ventilator not to receive
commands to resume oxygen supply and cause brain hypoxia to the patient. As such, a
new change impact analysis that considers the interactions between components for medical
life-critical system development is needed.
Many studies have examined how to integrate safety analysis into traceability research.
One such approach [20, 21, 22, 23] leverages model-based development so that system mod-
els can generate safety analysis automatically; examples of this include Fault-Tree Analysis
(FTA) [1] and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [24]. However, the imperfect pro-
cess of translation from system models to safety analysis can cause blind spots in impact
analysis. A significant amount of research has analyzed the impact of requirement changes
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on source code [59], but unfortunately, the impacts of requirement and design changes on
safety analysis have yet to be addressed. Moreover, most existing impact-analysis work
provides information about the affected areas in artifacts but does not indicate whether or
not an upstream artifact change (e.g., a design change) causes negative impacts to down-
stream ones (e.g., safety analysis), despite such information being crucial for safety analysis.
Furthermore, an intuitive approach to avoid the safety analysis from becoming outdated is
to flag critical components when a change is made to the component in safety critical sys-
tem development. However, this is only necessary but insufficient for medical systems that
require device interactions to provide correct services. Because configurations of medical
devices will be changed due to device interactions and the configurations themselves can
create safety hazards with no change to safety-critical medical devices (Class III medical
devices).
Commercial tools such as IBM Rational DOORS [25], Yakindu Traceability [26], and
Intland codeBeamer [27], are effective tools to support traceability for general use, but, they
do not and do not need to meet the FDA requirements of safety analysis when used to
develop non-medical systems. Even though some tools (e.g., codeBeamer) support safety
analysis such as Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) [24], the trace links are at a relatively
higher level and lack a more fine-grained control of trace links. Other tools, such as the
TraceLab [28], are a test-bed for instrumenting trace links and not designed for project
management. Our tool is a complement to the existing tools. We address this research gap
from a safety aspect on traceability for medical device plug-and-play systems.
Specifically, the focus is on how to track down the software components that need to
be changed when a new configuration creates a new fault tree. The framework ensures
the modified or newly created fault trees, due to the components changes, still meet the
safety requirements based on the minimum cut set generated by FTA for safety. Then, with
traceability between safety requirements, design, and safety analysis in place, our tool for
modified system design can decide whether the change can cause potential faults based on
its change-impact-analysis algorithm.
The main contributions of this paper are (1) the design of the SafeTrace framework
capable of managing traceability among safety requirements, design, and safety analysis in
MD PnP systems, and (2) a change-impact analysis, focused on safety analysis, that can
provide the information needed to answer questions such as whether a change of requirements
or design may cause safety violations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A network-connected airway laser-surgery
system we use as a case study is introduced in Section 4.2, along with background information
about requirements; system design with collaboration diagrams; and FTA. In Section 4.3,
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we present the proposed SafeTrace framework. Two change-impact-analysis algorithms for
safety analysis, one for requirement changes and the other for design changes, are presented
in Section 4.4. We present a tool implementation of SafeTracein Section 4.5. In Section 4.6,
we test how SafeTrace applied to an MD PnP system which can counter communication
failures, help trace the root cause of a failure, and add a safety requirement, as well as how
a life-critical system design change can affect safety analysis. Section 4.7 discusses related
work. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.8.
4.2 MEDICAL LIFE-CRITICAL SYSTEM EXAMPLE
The present work was motivated by our desire to improve the safety of airway laser surgery
(also known as laser tracheotomy). Using the design of an airway laser-surgery life-critical
system as an example, this section provides an introduction to life-critical system safety
requirements, system design, and safety analysis.
4.2.1 Tracheotomy Laser Surgery
In a laser tracheotomy [60], the life-critical system incorporates a ventilator and a laser
scalpel. A physician uses the scalpel to unblock the patients trachea. Because the patient is
under anesthesia, s/he breathes through a mask that supplies a high concentration (usually
100% [61]) of oxygen from the ventilator. During surgery, the laser beam could accidentally
ignite the tube; thus, fire in the operating room is the primary safety hazard. As such,
the flow of oxygen supplied by the ventilator should be blocked while the laser is emitting.
However, if the blocking of the oxygen flow from the ventilator exceeds a certain duration,
it will cause hypoxia and potential brain damage to the patient.
With this intuition of airway laser surgery, there are a few observations of the fire hazard.
First, the laser emission can ignite in a close vicinity with high concentration oxygen such as
an airway. It means that a laser scalpel can cause safety hazards only in a certain condition,
and, in this case, the condition is that an airway with high concentration oxygen. Second,
even we stop the oxygen supply to the patient under anesthesia, we cannot enable the laser
emission immediately. Because there is still high concentration oxygen in the airway and
needs to be ventilated outside the airway. A safe threshold of oxygen concentration with
potential surgical fire is less than 30%.
From a system perspective, for the laser scalpel, no-operation, 0 represents it is not emit-
ting the laser, and in-operation, 1 represents it is emitting. For the ventilator, in-operation,
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1 indicates that it is supplying high concentration oxygen, and no-operation, 0 represents
that it is supplying plain air only.
In the following three sub-sections, we introduce a Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP)
system [58, 38] to assist physicians to perform airway laser surgery, and set forth its safety
requirements, design, and safety-analysis procedures. Following the introduction of Safe-
Trace in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we will evaluate our methods using MD PnP for airway laser
surgery in Section 4.6.
4.2.2 Safety Requirements
Requirements engineering guides the whole system development process. For purposes
of this paper, we have limited the scope of safety requirements. An annotated requirement
artifact is defined as a text description of a safety goal that the system that needs to achieve.
An example of annotations is the universal identifier for a particular requirement. Hereafter,
we use the term “requirement” to refer an annotated requirement artifact.
In airway laser surgery, as discussed above, there are two safety requirements derived from
clinical needs that should be satisfied during the surgery operation:
• Safety Requirement 1 (SafeReq-1): To avoid fire, the ventilator and the laser scalpel
should never be in their respective in-operation states at the same time.
• Safety Requirement 2 (SafeReq-2): To avoid patient brain damage due to hypoxia, the
ventilator should remain in its no-operation state for no longer than a specified period.
The two requirements are related to two challenges during surgery, either of which can
lead to severe surgical failures. In regard to SafeReq-1, current practices rely heavily on the
surgery team to ensure that the laser scalpel and the ventilator are not in the in-operation
state at the same time, and despite their best efforts, mistakes can still easily occur. Second,
to meet SafeReq-2, surgical teams currently must simply remember what the safe period of
the ventilators no-operation state is, and when such a state began; so again, the possibility
of human error causing a tragic accident is relatively strong [37].
4.2.3 System Design
There are multiple ways to represent a systems design. For example, standard UML di-
agrams include class-, component-, and sequence diagrams, among others. In this paper,
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we use a collaboration diagram to describe software components, hardware devices, or plat-
form including both hardware and software as the main system-design artifacts. This allows
a level of design detail sufficient for our traceability framework to remain visible on users
operation views of the system.
To mitigate both medical hazards, an MD PnP laser-surgery system [58] is proposed to
solve the problem. Figure 4.1 presents its architecture, in which either the ventilator or the
laser scalpel has an MD PnP device adapter to communicate with a supervisory computer
through a wired network, enabling the coordination of a series of actions that can prevent
failures due to violations of SafeReq-1 and SafeReq-2.
By coordinating actions through the supervisor computer, the system can effectively pre-
vent operating-room fires, and thus complies with SafeReq-1. We use a scenario that a laser
scalpel operated by a surgeon requests to laser emission to demonstrate event propagations.
When the laser client adapter sends a laser-emission request to the MD PnP Application
(Commands 1 to 4), the supervisor computer examines the current state of the ventilator
(Commands 5 to 11). Then, the MD PnP Application sends a command to acknowledge the
laser operations (Commands 12 to 15). And whenever the ventilators oxygen supply is cut,





































Figure 4.1: The collaboration diagram of MD PnP Tracheotomy Systems. A rectangle is a




Safety analysis helps system engineers to identify the potential hazards associated with a
particular scenario, and to analyze whether the proposed system can mitigate such hazards
in a range of situations. Among various safety-analysis methods, Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA)
is one of the most widely used. One approach to FTA evaluation involves quantitative
evaluation of performance metrics, such as reliability or Mean Time To Failure (MTTF).
Another involves qualitative analysis of whether or not an input event that occurs at a trees
leaf node referred to as a primary event propagates to the failure in the root, an event
known as the undesired top event of the tree. Between primary events and the undesired top
event in a fault tree, there are intermediate events and logic gates. However, provided that
a trees logic gates are preserved, all the intermediate events can be eliminated. A method of
quality analysis for a fault tree is called a minimum cut set (MCS) [62], as further defined
below:
Definition 4.1. A cut set in a fault tree is a set of primary events whose occurrence (at the
same time) ensures that the TOP event occurs. A cut set is said to be minimal if the set
cannot be reduced in size without losing its status as a cut set.
For example, given the MCS = {{A}, {B,C}}, if either A, or B-and-C becomes true,
the hazard of the tree becomes True. For purposes of this paper, the undesired top event
is a medical safety hazard (e.g., fire or hypoxia). For more detail on fault trees and their



































































Figure 4.2: The Architecture of the SafeTrace Framework
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4.3 SAFETRACE TRACEABILITY FRAMEWORK
This section first presents SafeTrace aimed at facilitating life-critical system development.
Second, it defines the traceable artifacts in requirements, design, and safety analysis. And
third, it introduces trace links between artifacts and the evolutions of artifacts throughout
development, with a focus on trace link management for safety analysis.
4.3.1 Overview of SafeTrace
The goal of SafeTrace is to ensure that whenever design documents or system require-
ments are changed, the impact on safety analysis is evaluated. With this concept in mind,
Figure 4.2 presents the SafeTraces architecture. The left-hand side shows the three targeted
types of artifact: requirements, design documents, and safety analysis. Each artifact has
corresponding stakeholders, i.e., its designers; and all artifacts are either co-located in a
physical machine or in a distributed environment. The middle box circled with a dashed line
represents the SafeTrace framework. The SafeTraces main component is the Traceability
Manager, which contains a change management unit that defines the various trace links for
different artifact types. Once stakeholders have created trace links, these links are stored in
a traceability repository.
To detect changes made to requirements and design artifacts, each artifact type is associ-
ated with an Artifact Monitor, whose monitoring rules are specified in Change Management.
One way for a Monitor to detect an artifact change is by monitoring the artifacts repository.
Specifically, once a change of requirements or safety analysis is made and checked into the
associated repository, the corresponding Monitor can retrieve the artifact from the repository
and run an artifacts-parsing program to examine how it differs from the previous version.
Another method is to monitor artifacts during development, which allows the stakeholders
to be alerted before an updated artifact is checked into the repository. If a change to a re-
quirement or design artifact is observed, and that change is configured to trigger an impact
analysis, then SafeTrace will run the change-impact analysis (which will be discussed further
in Section 4.4). If the results of the change-impact analysis show that some part of the safety
analysis might be affected (potentially causing hazards), the SafeTraces notification module
notifies the relevant safety engineers.
4.3.2 Artifacts of Requirements, Design and Safety Analysis
A traceable artifact ai can be (1) an annotated requirement, (2) an annotated component
or device, (3) a top event in a fault tree, or (4) a basic event in a fault tree (we will further
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discuss this particular event in short). All artifacts are annotated, but a required annotation
is a universal identification number used for indexing/identification of all traceable artifacts.
We elaborate each traceable artifact ai below and present the trace links in the next section.
4.3.2.1 Requirements
A traceable requirement artifact is defined as a text description of a requirement with
annotations. The text description may specify the safety aspects of a systems desired goal.
4.3.2.2 Design
A traceable design artifact is a software component, a hardware device, or a platform
including both software components and hardware devices in design diagrams such as a com-
ponent diagram (for software components) or a deployment diagram (for hardware devices).
Depending on the need for granularity in tracing, an artifact might also be a platform that
includes both software components and hardware devices in an implementation diagram.
Although other system design levels such as finite state machines, system configurations,
etc. of the system are considered significant to a system design, it is beyond the scope of our
work. Here, we focus on the abstract architecture of a system.
4.3.2.3 Fault-Tree Analysis
In FTA, we can use the MCS theorems mentioned in Section 4.2.4 to reduce a tree to
its MCSs. For this purpose, a primary event could be a basic event, an external event, or
some other type of event [1], but for the purposes hereof, we focus only on basic events
and external events. Each event contains a proposition, which can be True or False. The
True value represents the event being triggered, whereas the False value means the event
does not occur. A basic event is one that does not develop further, i.e., is a leaf of a fault
tree. For example, a basic event could be that a ventilator is switched to its no-operation
state, stopping the supply of oxygen, and does not develop further. On the other hand, a
primary event can be an external event, which is treated as having a constant value. The
purpose of defining such events is to specify conditions when used with a basic event. For
example, one type of failure in airway laser surgery is hypoxia caused by SpO2, an estimate
of amount of oxygen in the blood, falling below a clinically required threshold, due to the
ventilator not supplying oxygen for a certain period of time, and the supervisor not being










































Figure 4.3: Fault-Tree Analysis, FireP2.FT1 , for Surgical Fire for MD PnP Tracheotomy
Systems
is the ventilator remaining at no-operation, which serves as a condition for the basic event:
that SpO2 falls below the required threshold.
Figure 4.3 is the FTA safety analysis of the MD PnP system with regard to fire hazard,
and its Subtree-1 is presented on the right-hand side of Figure 4.4. For brain hypoxia, the
fault tree is shown on the left-hand side of Figure 4.4; and further information on both of
these fault trees is presented in Table 4.1.
For safety purposes, we define a third type of event, a safeguard event. A safeguard event
is also a basic event but it is caused by a safety feature in the system design: for example, a
watchdog timer for monitoring how long a ventilator remains at no-operation. An event for
the watchdog timer could be that it fails to notify the physicians that the specified duration
has elapsed. The proposition will have the value False, because the timer is designed to
monitor the system at all times.
In an MCS, if all basic events become True simultaneously, the top event becomes True
and causes the type of failure associated with that top event. A single system may have
multiple fault trees, and each fault tree may have multiple MCSs. Based on the MCS theory,
we specify that a traceable artifact for FTA includes a top event of the tree (i.e., a failure
proposition), a basic event, and a safeguard event. We omit the traceability of intermediate
events (i.e., events between top events and basic events) and logic gates. An intermediate
event, meanwhile, is caused by some combination of input events. That is, an intermediate




























Figure 4.4: Fault-Tree Analysis, HypoxiaP2.FT2 , for Hypoxia for MD PnP Tracheotomy
Systems
events will be sufficient. And logic gates, which are used to set up the relations between
events, are preserved in the MCSs of each tree, so we only need to trace the basic events
belonging to each such MCS rather than the gates themselves. The fire-hazard trees MCS
is shown in Equation 1, and the brain-hypoxia trees MCS in Equation 2.
FireP2.FT1 = {{Eb.1, Eb.7, Ec.2}, {Eb.2, Eb.7, Ec.2},
{Eb.3, Eb.7, Ec.2}, {Eb.1, Eb.6, Ec.3}, {Eb.2, Eb.6, Ec.3},
{Eb.3, Eb.6, Ec.3}}
(4.1)
HypoxiaP2.FT2 = {{Eb.4, Eb.1, Ec.1}, {Eb.4, Eb.2, Ec.1},
{Eb.4, Eb.3, Ec.1}}
(4.2)
With the minimum cut sets, we can then define an affected fault-tree in Definition 4.2.
As mentioned before, a safeguard event in an MCS is used to guarantee that the proposition
of the top event will not be True. For basic events, we assume at least one basic event has
a trace link to a design artifact so that once the design artifact changes, the framework can
trace the corresponding events.
Definition 4.2. An affected fault-tree is defined as:
{AffectedFaultTree | ∃ Minimum Cut Set mcsk that has
1) at least one traced basic event,
2) no safeguard events,
in AffectedFaultTree,∀i, k ∈ N}
(4.3)
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Table 4.1: Events Used In Fault-Tree Analysis
Events Appeared Fault-Trees Meaning
Et.1 P2.FT
1
1 , P3.FT1 Surgical Fire
E2t.2 P2.FT
3
2 , P3.FT2 Brain Hypoxia
E4b.1 P2.FT2, P3.FT2, P2.FT1,
P3.FT1
MD PnP platform crashes
Eb.2 P2.FT2, P3.FT2, P2.FT1,
P3.FT1
MD PnP application crashes
Eb.3 P2.FT2, P3.FT2, P2.FT1,
P3.FT1
Network crashes
Eb.4 P2.FT2, P3.FT2 SpO2 drops below safe threshold
Eb.5 P3.FT2, P3.FT1 Open-loop safe software crashes
Eb.6 P2.FT1, P3.FT1 Ventilator is turned On
Eb.7 P2.FT1, P3.FT1 Laser is turned On
E5c.1 P2.FT2, P3.FT2 Ventilator is Off
Ec.2 P2.FT1, P3.FT1 Ventilator is On
Ec.3 P2.FT1, P3.FT1 Laser is On
E6s.1 P3.FT2, P3.FT1 Open-loop safe MD PnP device adapter
crashes
1Fault-Tree 1 (i.e., Fire) in Phase 2
2t represents the undesirable top event of a tree.
3Fault-Tree 2 (i.e., Hypoxia) in Phase 2
4b represents a basic event of a tree.
5c represents an external event with default value True.
6s represents an event with value False caused by
safe hardware or software.
4.3.3 Linking Traceability Relationships Among Domain Artifacts
Based on the artifact definitions presented in the previous sub-section, we can proceed to
define and discuss a trace link between two artifacts, as follows:
Definition 4.3. A trace link t(asrc,adst) is a directed edge from a source artifact asrc to
a destination artifact adst in a traceability graph G = (V, T ), where asrc, adst ∈ V and
t(asrc,adst) ∈ T . A (asrc, adst) tuple can be either one of the following: (acomponent, arequirement),
(adevice, arequirement), (abasicEvent, acomponent), (abasicEvent, adevice), and (atopEvent, arequirement).
A trace link can be represented as a directed relation, with the arrow pointed to a des-
tination artifact from a source artifact. For traceability within a group of artifacts of the
same type, the link can be built natively inside the artifacts. Here, therefore, we focus on
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trace links between artifacts of different types. A link between a design artifact and a re-
quirement artifact can be realized as the design implements the requirement. In the bottom
of Traceability Manager, Figure 4.2 presents such a trace link. For FTA purposes, a trace
link between a top event and a requirement artifact means that the top event (i.e., a failure)
violates the requirement. A trace link between a basic event at a leaf and a design artifact,
meanwhile, indicates that the basic event is caused by the design artifact. Typically, such a
link is built when developing a lower-level artifact that traces back to its origin, an upstream
artifact. For example, links between requirement- and design artifacts are built during the
design phase by system designers, and links from safety-analysis to requirement- or design
artifacts are built by safety engineers while analyzing the system. Traceability between re-
quirements and design objects can be built during the system-design phase, because a system
designer can design the system to satisfy a given set of requirements.
4.4 CHANGE IMPACT ANALYSIS
Having extended traceability to safety analysis, we are now ready to discuss the SafeTraces
impact-analysis algorithms for safety-analysis artifacts. Again, SafeTrace employs FTA as
its safety-analysis method. Since FTA shows the logical relations between different input
events, we can leverage it to perform impact analysis, which can reveal whether a change in
requirements or design will propagate to a failure at the root of the tree. In the first sub-
section below, we present our change models. Second, we present the necessary versions of
different artifacts to update one. Then, we discuss the impact of each change in each model.
For impact analysis, we first look at the impact of requirement changes on the design, and
then, at the impact of design changes on safety analysis. Finally, we develop an integrated
view of requirement and design changes, and discuss the effects of impact analysis on safety
analysis.
4.4.1 Change Models
For requirement and design artifacts, we define that a change as:
Definition 4.4. A change ci made to a requirement or a design artifact aj includes the
actions Creating, Deleting, or Updating the artifact aj, ∀i, j,∈ N
In the best case, we assume that there are no isolated artifacts. In other words, an artifact
must be linked to a source artifact, a destination artifact, or both: for example, a design
artifact might be linked to both a requirement and to an event in the fault tree. A trace
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link can be added at the time an artifact is created, though this is not required. When
we add a requirement, for instance, we do not add a trace link at the time it is created,
because (as previously mentioned) the building of trace links is associated with the design or
development of downstream artifacts. Hence, creating a requirement may not add any trace
links to the traceability graph. On the other hand, when adding a new software component
to a design, we generally set up one or more trace links between that component and one or
more requirements.
Given the assumption that there are no isolated artifacts, deleting a requirement artifact
or a design artifact will affect the traceability graph. For example, if a software module is
linked to a requirement and to safety analysis, then deleting this module from the design may
lead to that requirement becoming unsupported, or the event in the fault tree not occurring.
We will discuss the impact of deletion in Section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4.
A design or a requirement update might consist of editing the text description of an
artifact or its attributes. Since SafeTrace only traces artifacts based on their identification
numbers rather than their semantics, an update does not by itself change the relations in
the traceability graph, nor does the framework detect whether the change has a positive
or negative impact on its upstream or downstream artifacts. Thus, it is vital to notify
potentially impacted artifacts about the update. Then, the corresponding stakeholders must
check the affected artifacts. In Section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, we will discuss change-impact analysis
for requirements and design changes in terms of their relation to safety analysis.
4.4.2 Artifact Evolutions
After the trace links between artifacts have been established, they need to be updated as
artifacts change. In the bottom of Traceability Manager in Figure 4.2 in Section 4.3 depicts
evolutions and relations of different artifacts across multiple iterations. Here, an iteration
is defined as one or more changes made in one of the artifacts at a time. For example, an
iteration might only modify the requirements, and affect neither design nor safety analysis.
Hence, each artifact might have multiple versions, as denoted in the solid boxes in Figure 4.2.
In the bottom of Traceability Manager in Figure 4.2, a directed link between two boxes
in the same iteration represents the direction of a trace link from a downstream artifact
to an upstream one. The subscript of each artifact represents a committed version. For
instance, the top event of SafetyAnalysisver.k is traced to a requirement in Requirementsver.i,
and basic events are traced to design artifacts in Designver.j. A dashed-line outer box,
on the other hand, represents an iteration. For each new version of an artifact, we need
the artifact from the previous version and the latest version upstream artifact, if available.
53
For instance, if a new requirement is given and the design adjusted accordingly, perform-
ing SafetyAnalysisver.k+1 requires that we have the previous SafetyAnalysisver.k, the latest
upstream artifacts Requirementsver.i+1, and Designver.j+1. The following two subsections
discuss the requirement and design change-impact analysis for artifact evolutions.
4.4.3 Requirement Change Impact Analysis
Assume a traceability graph with reverse links between artifacts, that is, G′ = (V, T ′).
Reverse links can be built automatically by traceability-management tools when a stake-
holder sets up the trace link. A requirement has a reverse direct link to the artifacts it
is immediately related to: a design artifact and the root of a fault tree. In other words,
a requirement has information about which design- and fault-tree artifacts trace to it. A
requirement usually has direct links to at least one top event in a fault tree and at least one
design artifact, so we need to examine the potential effects on both design and on safety
analysis of each requirement change.
If a change creates a requirement, system designers and safety engineers need to check
whether the current design- and safety analysis artifacts support the newly created require-
ment, and modify or create new design- or safety-analysis artifacts accordingly. If a change
deletes a requirement, system designers and safety engineers need to check whether the orig-
inal corresponding design- or safety-analysis artifacts have become isolated. If they have,
stakeholders should consider removing them. Lastly, if a requirement change is an update
to a safety-related requirement, then it is necessarily related to certain fault trees, and the
stakeholders of the relevant FTA need to review it and decide whether the fault tree needs
modifications due to the updated requirement. Then, if the stakeholders of a design artifact
consider modifying their design because of the updated requirement, the original requirement
change becomes a design change. We address design changes in the next subsection.
4.4.4 Design Change Impact Analysis
When creating a design artifact, system designers need to set up the links between the
new artifact and certain requirements. Safety engineers must also examine whether the new
artifact is covered by safety analysis.
When deleting a design artifact, if its corresponding requirements become unsupported
by any design artifact, then the system designers need to check their design for whether or
not other design artifacts can support the requirement. (There should be no unsupported
requirements.) Likewise, safety engineers need to examine their safety analysis, since deletion
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of a design artifact might lead to basic events having no corresponding design artifact. In that
case, safety engineers should consider removing such events from the trees and re-evaluating
the relevant FTA.
The intuition of our approach to the change-impact analysis of the effects of design updates
on safety analysis is that, when all events in a fault-trees MCS become True, the failure
proposition of the tree becomes True. If one of the events in the MCS remains False e.g., an
event caused by a safe design element with high reliability then, state-changes of the rest of
the elements in the MCS will not result in such failure. It should be borne in mind that the
source of a trace link between design- and safety-analysis artifacts is a basic event of a fault
tree. If a basic event is also an element of a trees MCS, when a design artifact associated
with the basic event changes, our impact-analysis algorithm simply checks whether or not
the event in the associated MCSs caused the proposition of the failure to become True. For
example, given the MCS = {{A}, {B,C}}, assume an upstream design artifact is linked
to element A in the fault-tree. When the design artifact is updated, the algorithm will
determine that event A on the fault-tree might cause the hazard to occur, because event
A is the only element in the inner MCS, and if As state becomes True, it will make the
proposition of the failure become True. However, if there is more than one element in a cut
set, such as {B,C}, we need to further discuss the impact of the event.
Algorithm 4.1: Impact Analysis Algorithm for Design Update Changes
1 Input: An update change on a design artifact ai
2 Output: {FaultTreeα | AffectedFaultTreeα by ai,∀α, i ε N}
3 begin
4 linkedEvents ← getLinkedEvents(ai)
5 for each eventj in linkedEvents do
6 relatedMCSs ← getMcsBy(eventj)
7 for each mcsk in relatedMCSs do
8 requirement rl ←− getRequirementInMcs(mcsk)
9 if eventj is the only element in mcsk then
10 report requirement rl may be violated
11 report fault tree(s) linked by requirement rl
12 else
13 if no safe component in mcsk then
14 report requirement rl may be violated
15 report fault tree(s) linked by requirement rl
16 else
17 report requirement rl may NOT be violated
With this in mind, we present Algorithm 4.1, for analyzing design changes impact on
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safety analysis. The goal of this algorithm, given a design-artifact change as the input, is
to find all the fault trees whose failure proposition might become True as a result, along
with the related requirements. This step is described in L:1 and L:2. The outputs of the
algorithm are the affected fault trees and the related requirements. An affected fault tree is
previously defined in Definition 4.2 in Section 4.3.2.
Essentially, Algorithm 4.1 finds fault trees whose MCSs include basic events associated
with the given design artifact. If an MCS that does not have safeguard events, a change
made to the design artifact can lead to the basic event becoming True, and hence trigger
the failure of the tree.
First, the algorithm finds the relevant basic events in all FTAs associated with a given
design artifact ai in L:4. Second, for each basic event, the algorithm finds the MCSs that
include this event from L:5 to L:7. Next, if a basic event ej associated with the design
artifact ai in an MCS mcsk is the only element, then the algorithm reports that the failure
proposition of the fault tree might be True, and reports the requirements linked to the failure
proposition of the tree to the stakeholders.
Additionally, if there is more than one basic event in mcsk and none of its elements is a
safeguard event (i.e., an event that will remain safe, causing the value to remain False in the
tree), then the algorithm also reports that the failure of the fault tree might be triggered,
and identifies the related requirements. On the other hand, if there is a safeguard event in
mcsk, then the change to design artifact ai does not violate the failure proposition of the
tree. This is presented in L:9 through L:17. Since the algorithm needs to examine all the
MCSs related to artifact ai, the complexity of the algorithm is then O(n), where n is the
number of MCSs associated with ai.
4.5 SAFETRACE TOOL IMPLEMENTATION
As depicted in Figure 4.5, the SafeTrace tool consists of four parts. (1) Fault-Tree Models
Editor: a fault-tree model editor based on EMFTA [64]. (2) Traceability Setup: These
include Trace Links Builder, and Monitor and Parser that set up and process root-event-
and-requirement and basic-event-and-statechart trace links. (3) Traceability Manager: The
traceability manager provides a global view for stakeholders to review the captured trace
links. These modules are Traceability Browser, Traceability Graph Verifier to verify the
correctness of a traceability graph, Traceability Graph Repository which stores trace links,
and Report Generator. (4) Change Impact Analyzer: SafeTrace provides two change impact
analyses in the Change Impact Analyzer module, one for requirement changes and one for




























Figure 4.5: Overview of the SafeTrace Tool
4.5.1 Graphical Traceability-driven Fault-Tree Analysis Editor
The SafeTrace tool is based on the open sourced EMF-based Fault-Tree Analysis Tool
(EMFTA) [64]. Figure 4.6 presents the graphical editor of a fault-tree model.
The major components are: (1) the left panel is for project management that lists the
fault-tree files, traceability graph files. (2) The main panel is for editing a fault tree. For root
and basic events listed in the panel, a user can right-click an event to select the SafeTrace
tool. (3) A user can drag and drop events and gates from the left pallet into the main panel.
(4) Properties View in the editor lists the properties of an event or a gate. In addition to
the original event properties in EMFTA, we also add the resource identifier (i.e., URI), the
unique identifier (i.e., UUID), and a boolean variable to specify whether a basic event is a
safeguard [18]. If a basic event is a safeguard, then it means that the event always generates
a false value that could break a failure path to the failure event at the root.
4.5.2 Building Requirement and Root Event Trace Links
Figure 4.7 presents a SafeTrace wizard to build a root-event-and-requirement trace link.
To build a root-event-and-requirement trace link, a user can right-click a root event of a fault
tree, and select the wizard in the menu to build a trace link. At the top of Figure 4.7, a user
is asked to specify a ReqIf file including the requirement to be traced. After the specified
ReqIf is loaded, the SafeTrace wizard parses the input requirement file and lists the available
requirements in the file. A user can set up one requirement each time for the selected root
event. To add additional requirements to a root event, a user can simply repeat the above
process.
A trace link is captured by the SafeTrace automatically and stored internally as a file
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Figure 4.6: The SafeTrace tool in EMFTA environment. (1) File browser (2) Fault-tree
Editor (3) Fault-tree elements, and (4) Property Viewer
Figure 4.7: Building a Root-Event-and-Requirement Trace Link
with the file extension “tgml.” We name the file a Traceability Graph file. The Traceability
Graph is then used to perform requirement change impact analysis later.
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4.5.3 Building Statechart and Basic Event Trace Links
Figure 4.8 presents a user interface for selecting Statechart to be traced. A user first
right-clicks a basic event which is a leaf event in a fault tree to open the user interface for
setting up a trace link between a Statechart in an input Statechart model and a basic event
in a fault tree. Since a Statechart model (file extension “sct”) in YAKINDU Statechart
could include multiple Statecharts. The table is for selecting one of the Statechart included
in the given Statechart model to be traced. Similar to building root-event-and-requirement
trace links, once the trace link is selected and confirmed, the link is captured and managed
by the SafeTrace tool.
Figure 4.8: Building a Basic-Event-to-Statechart Trace Link
4.5.4 Traceability Browser and Requirement-and-Statechart Change Impact Analysis
Figure 4.9 presents the Traceability Browser in the SafeTrace tool. A user browses the
stored trace links in the two tables and performs analysis in the browser. (1) The top row is
the file path of a traceability graph to be loaded into the tool. (2) The first table from the
top lists the captured root-event-and-requirement trace links. (3) The second table lists the
captured basic-event-and-statechart trace links. In each table, a user can select one trace
link and perform actions on the corresponding right panel including, Perform Requirement
or Statechart Change Impact Analysis, Update, and Remove the trace link.
After loading the traceability graph, the SafeTrace tool can verify the traceability graph
in (4) of Figure 4.9. The verification rules include (a) The root of any fault-tree captured
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in a traceability graph should be traceable to at least one requirement. (b) Any basic event
of a tree should be traceable to a Statechart in a Statechart model. (c) Any URI of events
stored in the traceability graph should be locatable. (d) Any file path of artifacts including
requirements and Statechart models should be readable and available upon reading it. The
verification result is shown at the bottom of Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: View trace links in the Traceability Browser. Features in the Traceability
Browser include (1) Specifying traceability graph, (2) and (3) captured trace links, and (4)
Requirement and Statechart Change Impact Analyses, Traceability Graph Verifier, and
Report Generator.
We briefly describe the two change impact analysis algorithms. The detailed algorithms
are presented in the Section 4.3. For requirement changes, when the SafeTrace tool detects
a requirement is updated based on its timestamp in a ReqIf file, the SafeTrace finds out
all fault trees that linked with this updated requirement. For Statechart change impact
analysis, the algorithm is based on the minimum cut set theory and whether a safeguard
event exists in a cut set. If the selected Statechart is updated by SafeTrace checking the
Statechart model file, SafeTrace first finds all fault trees that have basic events linked to the
selected Statechart. Then, for each fault tree, SafeTrace generates minimum cut sets. For
each cut set that has the associated basic event linked by the selected Statechart, if there is
no safeguard event, then SafeTrace prompts the potentially affected fault trees to the user.
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Otherwise, the SafeTrace tool only reminds the user that the basic event(s) linked with the
updated Statechart appeared with a safeguard event in the cut set.
Finally, the SafeTrace tool provides a report generator to export a traceability graph in
(4) of Figure 4.9. A traceability report is mandatory by certification agencies and serves as
a proof that the engineered artifacts are traced across the development.
4.6 CASE STUDIES
This section evaluates SafeTrace and the impact-analysis algorithms for the MD PnP laser-
surgery system example via a case study, as described in Section 4.2. The original MD PnP sys-
tem represents the second phase of system development as depicted in Figure 4.10, and
therefore, the updated version of the system that has a communication fail-safe requirement
is the third phase. We begin by introducing the case of a requirement change: adding a
communication fail-safe requirement to Phase 2. Then, we show how the system design
must be altered in Phase 3 to prevent communication failures that might be caused by the
requirement change.
design.devicec.OLSAdapter






































Figure 4.10: Traceability Graph in Phase 2 and Phase 3. The areas in red color represent
changes made in Phase 3. Eb.5 and Es.1 are the newly added events in Phase 3. No trace
links setup for uncontrollable basic events Eb.1, Eb.3, and Eb.4.
4.6.1 Requirement Changes
As previously mentioned, the original MD PnP system relies on a wired network. Bear-
ing in mind SafeReq-1 and SafeReq-2, suppose that a surgical team wants a wireless-
communication version, to improve the systems usability in an already crowded operating
room. However, in such a scenario, the supervisor computer might lose contact with its med-
ical client devices due to wireless signal interference, or suffer long delays in the execution
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of its instructions to them. In our case, this might mean the supervisor not being able to
send further commands to the ventilator to re-supply oxygen, and such failure resulting in
hypoxia. As pointed out by the FDA, the development process of wireless medical devices
needs to guarantee their safety in the face of potential wireless-communication failures [17].
Communication failure can open the supervisor control loop, and is thus referred to as the
open-loop safe problem. As such, a new requirement to guard against communication failure,
known as SafeReq-3 or the open-loop safe requirement [2], is added.
• Safety Requirement 3 (SafeReq-3): The system shall bring the patient connected to the
system to a safe state (i.e., supply the patient with oxygen) without causing either fire
or hypoxia if communications between the supervisor computer and medical devices
fail.
In Phase 2, for both Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2 as set forth in Section 4.2.2, we only need to
trace basic events (i.e., events with subscript b) and do not need to trace external ones
that serve as conditions (i.e., lasting events with subscript c). As such, to comply with
SafeReq-3, the system designer first needs to know the system components in the second
phase that may be related to communication failure, and then address the related design
issues. From Figure 4.10, we can see that SafeReq-1, associated with hypoxia, is supported
by the MD PnP Application, MD PnP Platform, Network Router, Adapter, and Ventilator.
However, we only have control over the MD PnP Application, and Adapter, meaning that
we need to trace events related to these artifacts.
At this point, the system designers know that they need to address the design in the
MD PnP Application i.e., supervisory control computer and the Adapter for the medical
devices. (Because a device adapter only performs the commands it receives, the only differ-
ence between the adapters for the ventilator and for the laser scalpel in the real world is the
interface; so, for simplicitys sake, we do not differentiate between the adapters for these two
devices.) From Figure 4.10, we can see that Eb.2, to the MD PnP Application; and Eb,6 to
the Adapter. Eb.2 appears among the minimum cuts in the first set in both FireP2.FT1 and
HypoxiaP2.FT2 in Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2, respectively. However, because neither of these sets
includes any safeguard events, if Eb.2 becomes True, then both hypoxia and fire may occur.
Hence, according to L:13 in Algorithm 4.1, we report that both SafeReq-1 and SafeReq-2
may be violated due to the new requirement.
4.6.2 Design Changes
In Phase 3, the system designer modifies MD PnP Application software and Device
Adapters, and sets up a trace link between it and SafeReq-3. The application software
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sends out the predefined timed commands to client adapters, and hence there are periods
when no communication is needed, i.e., after a predefined command has been received by a
MD PnP Adapter.
With SafeReq-3 and the modified design artifacts in place, safety engineers can update
safety analysis in Phase 3. By running Algorithm 4.1, they can identify the relevant events
from the MCSs of each fault-tree. Given the updated requirements and the updated system
design, the engineers are now able to update the safety-analysis in the previous version:
specifically, to enable examination of whether the modified components satisfy the new
requirement, and what its impact on the existing system is.
Figure 4.11 shows the updated safety analysis of fire hazard, with the fault-trees updated
to take account of the open-loop safe MD PnP device adapters. The new events and trace
links are colored in red and presented in Figure 4.10. The MCSs of the fire fault-tree in



























Figure 4.11: Fault-Tree Analysis, FireP3.FT1 , for Surgical Fire for MD PnP Open-Loop Safe
Tracheotomy Systems
FireP3.FT1 = {{Es.1, Eb.1, Eb.6, EC.3},
{Es.1, Eb.2, Eb.5, Eb.6, Ec.3}, {Es.1, Eb.3, Eb.6, Ec.3},
{Es.1, Eb.1, Eb.7, Ec.2}, {Es.1, Eb.2, Eb.5, Eb.7, Ec.2},
{Es.1, Eb.3, Eb.7, Ec.2}}
(4.4)
From Eq. 4.4, we can see that a safeguard event Es.1 is now present in each MCS. Es.1 is
“Open-loop safe MD PnP device adapter crashes.” Since event Es.1 is caused by an open-
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loop safe MD PnP device adapter, the value remains False, meaning that no MCS in the
HypoxiaP3.FT2 will become True, even if every basic event within it becomes True.
Figure 4.12 depicts the updated fault-tree analysis for brain hypoxia. The MCSs of the
































Figure 4.12: Fault-Tree Analysis, HypoxiaP3.FT2 , for Hypoxia for MD PnP Open-Loop Safe
Tracheotomy Systems
HypoxiaP3.FT2 = {{Es.1, Eb.4, Eb.1, Ec.1},
{Es.1, Eb.4, Eb.2, Eb.5, Ec.1}, {Es.1, Eb.4, Eb.3, Ec.1}}
(4.5)
The above medical example illustrates how SafeTrace can be used to set up trace links be-
tween different artifact types. With traceability between artifacts having been established,
we demonstrated a scenario in which a new safety requirement was added; and having
done so, we used the change-impact analysis algorithms described in Section 4.4 to demon-
strate how to identify impacts, and update safety analysis and traceability, when a design is
changed.
4.7 RELATED WORK
Fault-tree analysis is a widely used safety analysis method to evaluate a system’s capabili-
ties against potential hazards. According to Matins and Gorschek [65], FTA is the most used
safety-analysis method for handling safety requirements: accounting for 23% among the 21
methods they surveyed. Hussian and Eschbach [22] proposed a framework to automatically
generate FTAs using system models. In that framework, the negation of safety constraints
is treated as a fault in a fault-tree, and the combination of events then becomes the path
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of the fault tree to reach the root, which is a failure. However, this model-based approach
requires having correct and detailed system models, which are hard to maintain over the
long term; and out-of-date models will eventually make a generated fault-tree deviate from
reality. Mason [23] proposed an integrated framework, MATra, which focuses on providing
traceability between the records generated by CASE tools for safety-critical systems. How-
ever, it is not clear how to generalize the framework without using the CASE tools, which
in practice are frequently updated and constantly evolving.
Traceability is an established tenet in the software-engineering community, and a large
body of research confirms its importance in and positive impact on project development.
Many regulatory agencies covering a range of industry sectors have also recognized its im-
portance, and subsequently incorporated it into various standards and guidelines. For ex-
ample, the FDA [66] mandates that traceability analysis be used to verify that the software
design of a medical device implements the specified software requirements; that all aspects
of the design are traceable to software requirements; and that all code is linked to estab-
lished specifications and test procedures. The FAA standard DO-178C [67] specifies that
at each stage of development, software developers need to demonstrate the capability of
tracing designs against requirements. Research by Gries [68] also indicates that the most
powerful aspect of traceability is that it provides the foundation for impact analysis, and
hence provides the affected components once a change is made even in a large-scale project
like the Boeing 777s autopilot flight-director system. Rahimi et al. [69] proposed a frame-
work that enables automatic updating of the links between requirements and source code
across different software- and requirement versions. Hill and Victor [70] created a software
safety risk taxonomy for safety-critical systems; and Kugele and Antkowiak [59] proposed a
method for visualizing trace links based on component-based software development, along
with an impact-analysis algorithm based on the traceability graph generated by the visu-
alization. Guo et al.s [71] automated approach to generating the rationales for each link
improves upon the legacy approach, in that many links can share the same semantics and a
richer expression per link. And based on an examination of numerous open-source projects,
Rempel and Mader [72] found that software quality was positively affected by increases in
the completeness of requirements traceability.
Although it is important to maintain requirement-to-code traceability, it is also neces-
sary from a safety-critical system-development perspective to maintain trace links to safety
analysis, since such analysis is mandated by certification organizations and development
standards. Mader et al. [73] recommended that, instead of focusing on tracing all require-
ments, a more pragmatic approach would be to focus on creating trace links that specifically
support safety-analysis feasibility. However, it is not always clear what safety-analysis meth-
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ods are in use, or how to trace their relationships with requirements and design. Our work
is a complement to the above-mentioned studies. Katta et al. [74] proposed a conceptual
model of traceability for safety systems, in which the level of traceable artifacts is relatively
higher when specific safety-analysis methods are not referred to. We would take this line
of thinking further, by elaborating safety analysis and pinning down a detailed traceability
framework for FTA. Bishop and Bloomfield [75] used safety cases as traceable artifacts from
different system levels, and although they mentioned FTA, the question of how to set up
and manage trace links within FTA remained unclear.
Another approach to integration traceability for safety-critical systems is model-driven
development. Briones et al.s [20] methodology, for example, integrates safety analysis into
software development the key being to have software engineers and system analysts edit the
same system models. This helps to avoid consistency issues by linking models with different
versions of the software. Sanchez et al. [76] also proposed a model-driven methodology to
support safety requirements, by embedding such requirements into software development,
thus rendering them traceable. Peraldi-Frati [77] proposed another method of model-driven
development, focusing on timing-critical systems; but it did not include safety analysis, which
is also crucial to the success of safety-critical systems development. The present research
can, therefore, be regarded as a complement to model-driven development for traceability in
life-critical systems.
4.8 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter has proposed a safety-driven traceability framework, SafeTrace, for managing
traceability in life-critical systems, including trace links between safety requirements, design
objects, and events of safety-analysis. Our major contribution is that the SafeTraceintegrates
safety analysis into the requirement traceability. Specifically, our proposed method sets
up trace links (1) between design artifacts and basic events in fault trees MCSs, and (2)
between requirements and the top event (i.e., failure proposition) of each tree; and once
such trace links have been established, the proposed impact-analysis algorithms can be
used to identify the effects on safety analysis that are caused by requirement- and design
changes. In the case study of an airway laser-surgery system with SafeTrace, we added a new
safety requirement: that the system, once modified to a wireless version, can function fail-
safe during communication failures. The results demonstrate that SafeTrace was capable of
quickly and accurately locating the impacted safety-analysis areas, and of correctly updating
and maintaining traceability within the system. Our approach on safety-driven traceability
could be potentially applied to other application areas that safe interaction between devices
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is a key concern. We plan to adopt the SafeTrace framework in the development of a pediatric
cardiac resuscitation system from an adult version [37, 78]. Future directions of our work
include source-code-to-fault-tree traceability, and traceability on quantitative safety analysis.
We publish a version of this chapter in the research paper [18].
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CHAPTER 5: BUILDING TRACEABILITY FOR HETEROGENEOUS
ARTIFACTS IN MEDICAL CPHS DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Requirement traceability is widely recognized as a critical aspect when building a life-
critical system. It provides the ability to trace the requirements, associated components, and
the information flowing in a system. The information could include a patient’s physiological
signal in a medical guidance system. When building such a life-critical system with different
artifacts in the system, it is common to use different artifacts to compose a system. These
artifacts, for example, could be medical Statechart models, software written in Java or other
programming languages, and medical devices.
Research works [29, 30, 31] leverage event-based systems and the Pub/Sub communication
pattern to manage and deliver the change events. However, it is challenging to address an
architecture change to the existing system due to complex system components interactions
and the lack of human resources or limited budget. Moreover, existing work of traceability
for distributed systems lacks a unified change impact analysis such that the impacted system
components of information or a system change can be quickly identified and appropriately
handled. These problems become even more challenging when the system scales up.
We present a requirement traceability framework based on the exchanged information
between entities of different artifact types to set up traceability of information flow for
distributed systems and automatically and continuously maintain the trace links based on
the current Pub/Sub communication pattern. To model the traceability, we use a tripar-
tite graph to represent a traceability graph for a Pub/Sub-based distributed system. For
inter-component information flow, we leverage the already use of Pub/Sub pattern in many
distributed systems. This approach does not need significant modification to the existing
infrastructure or system architecture. It provides a lightweight mechanism to trace the in-
formation flow. Another contribution of the chapter is that we propose a Change Monitor
Tree Analysis (CMTA) that provides a structure to integrate the different types of changes
and the affected components. Based on the traceability graph and the CMTA, we present
an algorithm to find the impacted components given an attribute change of the exchanged
information. To further express the impact caused by a change event, we use a tree structure
to represent the change impact from top-down and a graph representation for information
flow. Both generated graph representation of a change event and change propagation help
to explore the impacted areas in a system such that one can declare that a change event is






















Given configuration of publishers, subscribers,  topics, 
and attributes used in a Publish-Subscribe System
Figure 5.1: Major components and workflow of Trapas, a framework for requirement
traceability for Pub/Sub-based systems
We organize this chapter as follow. We will use the motivation example, a Sepsis guidance
system, from Chapter 3. We present the Trapas traceability framework in Section 5.2 and
change management in Section 5.3. The related work is presented in Section 5.4. We discuss
the future direction in Section 5.5. We conclude this chapter in Section 5.6. Finally, we
provide user feedback of using Trapas in Appendix A.
5.2 ARCHITECTURE-BASED REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY
We present the Trapas traceability framework. We discuss how to use Trapas set up
traceability links using Pub/Sub pattern for Statechart and Java software as used in the
motivation guidance system for Sepsis. In the first subsection, we present the system ar-
chitecture and the definitions of traceable artifacts in Trapas. In the second subsection, we
present the workflow of how to set up a particular trace link for artifacts of different types.
5.2.1 Traceability framework for Publish-and-Subscribe-based distributed systems
When designing a distributed system, a Pub/Sub pattern is a common choice to build
the communication mechanism for distributed systems. For such systems, there are abstract
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objects including publishers, subscribers, topics, and messaging brokers. We define each
term as follow.
A topic is a piece of information shared between two parties, and typically the topic is
stored in a message broker. Although there is research work on the Pub/Sub framework
without a messaging broker, here, we focus on a typical Pub/Sub communication framework
with at least one messaging broker. Each topic could have a specification that indicates
attributes including unit, data type, default value, etc. For a party(s) whichever sends the
topic out to the message broker, we call the party a publisher or a sender. Similarly, for
a party(s) requires the topic, we call the party a subscriber or a receiver. In the scope of
this chapter, we consider a publisher or a subscriber could be either a region in a Statechart
model or a class in a software program written in Java or other object-oriented languages.
Here, we specify a publisher or a subscriber in an intermediate-grained level. For software
components, it is sufficient to trace the information artifacts in a class level because it is
usually easier to trace the source code within the class level than at the package level in Java
or the whole project. For a Statechart model, it is sufficient to trace the information artifacts
in a region in a Statechart model. A region may be treated as a class in a software program.
It is also relatively easy to navigates states in the same region in a Statechart model. As
such, the granularity for both software programs and Statechart models is adequate for the
proposed traceability framework.
The relations between publishers and topics are many-to-many. That is, a publisher can
publish more than one topic, and a topic has at least one publisher. For example, a display
program in a guidance system is a publisher, and it publishes multiple topics including
physician’s medical orders, system logs, and medical warnings. The system-log topic may
have multiple publishers such as the display program or the medical guidance model in the
Statechart simulation environment. Similarly, the relations between topics and subscribers
are also many-to-many. A topic should have at least one subscriber, and a subscriber may
subscribe more than one topic.
5.2.2 Building Traceability Graphs and Link
We first define the models and definitions used in Trapas. Then, we introduce the workflow
to build traceability links for Pub/Sub-based distributed systems.
5.2.2.1 Overview, Models, and Definitions
We use a graph representation to represent the information flow. We call such a graph a
Traceability Graph (TG). A node in a TG could be either an information provider (i.e., a
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publisher node), an information receiver (i.e., a subscriber node), or a piece of exchanged
information (i.e., a topic node) in a Pub/Sub-based system. A TG is a directed graph, as
shown in Figure 5.2. A directed edge pointed from a publisher node to a topic node represents
the sender publishes the information to the topic. It represents that the information flows
from the publisher to the topic. Similarly, an edge pointed from a topic node to a subscriber
node represents the subscriber receives the information from the topic. For the design of the















Figure 5.2: A generic traceability graph (TG). A TG has three groups of nodes, namely,
publisher, topic, and subscriber group. The direction of an edge represents that the
information flows from the source to the destination of the edge. ni represents entity i. tj
represents topic j.
As mentioned earlier, an entity serves either a publisher role, a subscriber role, or both
roles at the same time. We can model a TG as a custom tripartite graph where the first
group nodes are publishers, the second group nodes are topics, and the third group nodes
are subscribers as presented in Figure 5.2. There are edges pointed from a publisher to a
topic and from a topic to a subscriber. As such, it can appear in the publisher group, the
subscriber group or both groups.
A TG is a directed acyclic graph. However, the graph of information flow generated from
a TG could be cyclic. We will discuss the graph of information flow in the next section.
5.2.2.2 Workflow to Build Traceability Links
As stated previously of Moss middleware in Chapter 3, there are usually communication
rules to configure topics, publishers, subscribers, access control policies in a Pub/Sub-based
system. These rules can be recorded in a configuration file. The configuration file specifies
authentication and authorization rules to access a topic for each entity whether it is a class
in a software program or a region in a Statechart model. Moreover, the communication
rules also specify the available topics in a system and attributes of each topic. With the
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configuration file, we can start to build a TG for a Pub/Sub-based system. Figure 5.3 is
a configuration file to configure a “Heart.HeartRate” topic as well as its publishers and
subscribers.
Figure 5.3: A configuration file is written in XML for the heart rate topic and entities
including the Admin and Heart regions and the GUI program in a system. The attributes
of the topic including publishers, subscribers, a default value, a unit, and a data type.
First, we extract the entities (i.e., a Java class or a region in a Statechart model) and
the topics from the configuration files. For each topic, we created a node labeled with the
topic’s name and ID, and add it into the second group nodes (topic group). For each entity,
if it presents in the publisher field of a topic, then we add a node labeled with the entity’s
name and ID into the first group nodes (publisher group) and add a directed edge from the
newly added publisher node to the topic node. Similar steps for a subscriber, if an entity is
a subscriber of a topic, then we create a node labeled with the entity’s name and ID in the
subscriber group and create a directed edge from the topic to the subscriber node.
It is worth mentioning that, for each entity, it could appear in the publisher group, sub-
scriber group, or both groups. If the two nodes, one from the publisher group and one from
a subscriber group, have the same name or the same ID, we treat the two nodes as the
same entity. Now, we have a traceability graph that includes all the entities, topics, and
relations between entities and topics. A traceability graph is a core to achieve traceability
and perform impact analysis algorithms.
In this section, we present how to set up trace links between publishers, subscribers, and
topics for a Pub/Sub-based system. Once a traceability graph is generated, we can use
the graph to trace information flow. However, we need a mechanism to decide what are
the change event that a system can monitor, what are the impacted components of such
change, and when does the change stop impacting further components. We will address
these questions in the following section.
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5.2.3 Exploring Information Flow by Visualization
To understand the impact of a change to a system, it is better to visualize the impacted
components in the system. We visualize the impact of a change in a graph representation
named Information Flow Graph (IFG). We use an IFG to present a global picture of the
information flow through the system regardless of the change.
Figure 5.4: An Information Flow Graph for the Kidney region in a Statechart model in a
Sepsis guidance system. Notice that the graph is cyclic because of the feedback loop shown
in the figure.
In an IFG, we explore a global picture of how publishers, subscribers, and topic that
interact with each other. We can generate an IFG from a traceability graph. Figure 5.4
shows an example of an Information Flow Graph for Sepsis. A node with a text label
beginning with “region” or “program” represents that it is an entity node and it could be
either a publisher, subscriber, or both. For topics, a node with a text label beginning with
“topic” represents that it is a topic node. An edge in an IFG represents the information
flow from the source to the destination of the edge. Notice that there is no edge between
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two entities, and it reflects what we have seen from a traceability graph as described before
that there are no edges between publisher and subscriber groups.
We can automatically generate an IFG from a traceability graph. Given a TG, we can
start to construct an IFG by first inserting each topic from the TG as a topic node to the
IFG. For each topic node in the IFG, we reference the TG to see what are the publishers
and subscribers of the topic. If a publisher or a subscriber of the topic does not present in
the IFG, we then add it to the IFG and add a directed edge from the publisher to the topic
or the topic to the subscriber. The process of generating an IFG finishes when we visit the
whole topic nodes and corresponding publishers and subscribers. We can also generate an
IFG directly from the configuration file for the communication in a Pub/Sub-based system
by following the similar process mentioned above.
Recall that we mention there could be a cycle in an IFG. Figure 5.4 also shows this fact
that the Java GUI program subscribes the Sepsis State topic; hence, it forms a feedback
loop back to the Java GUI program. As such, we need to discuss when a change impact
stops propagating further during a change refactoring process.
5.3 CHANGE MANAGEMENT
The motivation to build traceability graph for traceable artifacts is that we want to know
the impacted components of a change introduced when refactoring, debugging, and receiving
new requirements. We present two methods, namely, Change Monitor Tree Analysis (CMTA)
to monitor the change of each topic and Change Impact Tree Analysis (CITA) to organize
the impact of each change on publishers and subscribers.
We first introduce CMTA to organize and manage changes to be monitored for each topic.
Then, based on the CMTA and a generated traceability graph from the configuration file
for a Pub/Sub-based system mentioned in the previous section, we present a change impact
analysis algorithm and CITA. We answer the questions of how a change event propagates
throughout the system and when the propagation stops.
5.3.1 Change Monitor Tree Analysis (CMTA)
CMTA is an analysis that logically organizes the attributes of traceable information (i.e., a
topic in our context). It has a similar tree structure like fault-tree analysis (FTA) [1]. Both
analysis frameworks aim for logically organizing the event.
In a CMTA, we define the root of a change monitor tree is a binary-valued root node. The
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Other Sepsis Related Topics
Other Topic Groups
OR
A Sepsis Requirement Change Event is Triggered
… more attributes
Figure 5.5: A Change Monitor Tree example. We can use this tree to monitor Heart Rate
topic and its attributes. The tree also presents intermediate nodes structure including logic
gates, topic nodes, and topic group nodes. We trace the root to a requirement.
root node’ value is True represents that a lower level event can reach the root level and will
need an engineer to investigate the impacted areas of the system. A leaf node in a change
monitor tree is a change event of an attribute of a tracked topic. We name the leaf node
as an attribute node. A node that sits right on top of an attribute node is a topic node.
Between the root node and topic nodes, there could be one or multiple intermediate nodes
that can organize multiple topics into a topic group. We name such a node as a topic group
node.
Figure 5.5 shows a partial change impact tree example for a Sepsis guidance system. There
are logic gates, including an AND and an OR gate to connect the root node, topic group
nodes, topic nodes, and attribute nodes. Although there is no restriction of the use of logic
gates to connect the nodes, in a typical use of CMTA, the logical gate between a topic group
node and the root is OR. It resembles that any connected topic group change can trigger
the root change event. If the gate between a topic group node and it children topic nodes
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is OR, it means any of the topic changes can make the change propagation reach the topic
group node and may even reach the root. Furthermore, if the gate between a topic node and
its attribute node(s) is OR, this implies that any change of an attribute node can trigger
the change event for that specific topic. The change event may propagate to reach the root,
and it indicates the needs to investigate the physical change to the system.
5.3.2 Change Impact Tree Analysis (CITA) and Change Impact Algorithms
Assume we have a TG and a complete change impact tree, given a change of a topic, we
would like to know how the change propagates throughout the system and how the change
stops propagation. First, we define a change is a modification made to an attribute of a
topic. The topic and its publishers and subscribers shall be traceable in the traceability
graph, and it should be identifiable in the given change impact tree.
CITA is an iterative process to organize the impacted components caused by a topic
change. Furthermore, we present a change impact analysis algorithm based on CMTA and
CITA. The process to perform CITA and construct a change impact tree is an interactive
and iterative process based on the result of a change impact analysis in Algorithm 5.1. The
intuition is that with a new change of each topic discovered in the change impact analysis,
we can then update a change impact tree by adding nodes including an entity node (i.e., a
publisher or a subscriber), a topic node, or a null node indicating the change does not
propagate further.
A change impact tree is a k-ary tree structure where each node can have zero or up to k
children, as shown in Figure 5.6. We start to build the tree top-down. The root is a topic
node labeled with the change of a topic. The next level nodes are a group of entity nodes
including publishers and/or subscribers which publish and subscribe to the topic respectively.
These entities are likely to be affected by the change of the topic. Unlike the CMTA is a
logic tree that uses logic gates to connect the nodes on different levels, a change impact tree
does not have logic gates. A parent node has a direct edge pointed to a child node in a
change impact tree. The direction of an edge represents the impact of the parent node to
the child node. As such, the root has a directed edge pointed from itself to each child node.
After an engineer investigating whether the change of a topic attribute reaching the root
propagates to a publisher or a subscriber, if there is no new change, we then append a
null node at the next level to each entity node, and the propagation stops. On the other
hand, if there is any new change of a topic discovered during the process of investigation,
we append a topic node to the entity node and then recursively visit each topic node that
an entity interacts with to see whether any further topic change propagates to publishers or
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subscribers. Essentially, we adopt a breadth-first search approach for searching impact on
each children node. As such, we will see that a tree is alternating each level with topic nodes
or entity nodes until every leaf node of the tree becomes a null node. It means the impact
caused by the first change stops and the whole change-impact-tree construction finishes.
t1 change
n1.p n2.p n3.s n4.s








n3.p.s Node n3 as both publisher 
and subscriber
null The change impact stops
Topic t1 change
Figure 5.6: A possible change impact tree is generated given a change of topic t1
in Figure 5.2. A change impact is propagating top-down from the root to each leaf node.
Algorithm 5.1 presents the heuristics of change impact analysis for a topic’s attribute
change. Given a change of a topic’s attribute, we check whether the topic and its attributes
are traced and monitored in a CMTA and whether a change of an attribute can reach the
root node of the change monitor tree, as shown in L:4 and L:6. We use minimum cut set
methods as presented in the previous work [18] to decide whether an event at a leaf node
will reach the root. Then we identify the publisher(s) and subscriber(s) of the topic in L:8
and L:10.
For the entities in entitiesOfTopic, if it is a publisher, the publishers should be examined
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Algorithm 5.1: An Impact Analysis Algorithm of CITA for Topic Attribute Changes
in a Pub/Sub System
1 Input: A change on an attribute ai.0 of the topic tj.0, Traceability Graph (TG), Change
Monitor Tree Analysis (CMTA)
2 Output: {ImpactedEntityα | ImpactedEntityα by ti, ∀α, i, j ∈ N}
3 begin
4 if attribute ai.0 or topic tj.0 is not traced in CMTA then
5 return attribute ai.0 or topic tj.0 is not traced
6 if change of attribute does not reach the root in a CMTA then
7 return attribute ai.0 change does not cause impact
8 for each publisherk has a trace link to topic tj.0 in TG do
9 Add publisherk into entitiesOfTopic
10 for each subscriberl has a trace link pointed from topic tj.0 in TG do
11 Add subscriberl into entitiesOfTopic
12 for each entityk in entitiesOfTopic do
13 Modify the entity interface to address the topic’s attribute change.
14 if the resultant modification causes modification of attributes ai.1 of another topic
tj.1 then
15 add a pair of (ai.1, tj.1) to topicAndAttributeList
16 Recursively run Algorithm 5.1 with topicAndAttributeList as the input.
against its implementation to see whether it can publish the topic with modified attributes
in L:12. We call them affected publishers and the actions that ripple the change, backward
propagation. If any publisher needs to modify any other topic to address the current topic
change, the impact will ripple to other entities or topics in the system. If all publishers are
updated to publish the modified topic with the updated attributes and no publisher makes
any change to any other topics, then the backward propagation stops.
For the entities in entitiesOfTopic, if it is a subscriber, the subscriber should be examined
against its implementation to see whether it can subscribe and handle the topic with modified
attributes. We call them affected subscribers and the actions that ripple the change forward
propagation. If any subscriber needs to modify any other topics in order to address the
current topic change, the impact will ripple through the system as well. If all subscribers
can subscribe to the topic with updated attributes and no subscriber made any change to
any other topics, then the forward propagation stops. Once the backward propagation and
the forward propagation of the first topic change stop, we can safely declare that the full




Research works [29, 30, 31] leverage event-based systems and the Pub/Sub communication
pattern to manage and deliver the change events. The paper [79] use SystemML (Systems
Modeling Language) to implement the Event-Based Traceability (EBT) and provide a user
study to prove the usefulness of the system. The paper [80] proposed using a scope to provide
a hierarchy for the event-based system. However, it is challenging to address an architecture
change to the existing system due to complex system components interactions and the lack
of human resources or limited budget. Moreover, existing work of traceability for distributed
systems lacks a unified change impact analysis such that the impacted system components of
information or a system change can be quickly identified and appropriately handled. These
problems become even more challenging when the system scales up.
The paper [81] proposes an architecture to integrate a wearable healthcare IoT and medical
information system. In the environment, it provides the traceability of the streaming data
from the medical IoT. The paper [82] discusses the concept of protecting a distributed
system from the security perspective. For example, its security policies should be followed
from humanly understandable level to machine implementation level. Our work targets a
Pub/Sub-based distributed system as motivation system. We only rely on the information
flow based on publishers and subscribers and the attributes of the exchange topics. Trapas
provides a more generalized approach of requirement traceability for existing systems build
with the Pub/Sub communication pattern.
5.5 DISCUSSION
Currently, the design of Trapas focuses on tracing information at a level of entities as a
publisher and/or subscriber. If the source code for the software entity or the Statechart
model for a region is available, then we can also further extend a traceability graph to a
deeper level (i.e., code level or state level within a region in a Statechart model). There
are benefits and consideration regarding extending the traceability into an entity. For the
benefits, the finer granularity of the traceability certainly provides powerful features such as
pinning down the change to a function or statement level. This granularity is similar to the
helper features implemented in many IDE to provide syntax checking in the statement level.
However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. We focus on how to set up traceable artifacts
from a system perspective in terms of information flow. For the considerations to integrate
with the artifacts at a lower level, we also need new tools to support the traceability at a
deeper level. This work provides a foundation to trace entities in a distributed environment.
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For the completeness of the chapter, we discuss the possible directions to extend the
traceability into an entity. To extend the traceability graph to a deeper level of entities, we
are looking at a state level in a Statechart model and a source code statement level of a class
in Java. For Statechart models, by searching the name of a topic in the definition section of
a Statechart model and a state which accesses the topic inside a region in Statechart model,
we can trace the state and the topic in a Statechart model.
5.6 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter presents Trapas, a requirement traceability framework of tracing informa-
tion flow for a distributed system that is based on Pub/Sub communication pattern. Our
contribution of the Trapas framework includes a traceability graph based on the informa-
tion flow, Change Monitor Tree Analysis, and Change Impact Tree Analysis. Specifically,
the proposed traceability framework includes three core components. First, we present a
traceable graph (i.e., TG) in a tripartite graph that represents the relations among pub-
lishers, subscribers, and topics. Second, we propose a logical tree structure (i.e., CMTA)
to organize the monitored attributes of a topic and detect whether an attribute change of a
topic will require engineers’ investigation of the change. Third, we present a tree structure
called CITA to structure the impacted components given an attribute change of a topic.
Furthermore, we present a graph representation, IFG, for the information flow, and an IFG
discloses a global picture of the information exchanged between publishers and subscribers.
Future directions of our work include extending traceability to the source code level or state
level in a Statechart model.
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CHAPTER 6: SYSTEMATIC MODELING OF MEDICAL GUIDANCE
SYSTEMS WITH PREVENTABLE MEDICAL ERRORS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Medical systems are well-known as being life critical and requiring high reliability. Life-
critical requirements are that the system cannot directly or indirectly cause hazards to human
life through malfunctions or design flaws. Reliability requirements are that the system itself
must have the high reliability that any potential failure needs to be mitigated and human
life does not suffer as a consequence.
One typical category of such medical systems is medical guidance and navigation systems.
Take the concept of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for example; vast drivers rely
on GPS to guide the way to their destination. Drivers may have partially, faulty or no
knowledge of the routes to their destination. Hence, when they make route decisions during
driving, they rely on GPS as an assistant to make decisions. If the driver determines not
to follow the current suggestion, then GPS will recalculate the routes based on the current
position. Similar concepts can be applied to a medical guidance and navigation system.
Numerous medical organizations publish best practice guidelines for many medical work-
flows, procedures, and operations. Physicians and nurses try to apply these guidelines to
the patients and expect to get the best results possible. However, it may be a challenge
for physicians and nurses at the bedside to follow accepted practice guidelines in the most
precise manner desired when accompanied by a huge number of information from multiples
medical devices. To overcome the challenge, computer executable formats of those well val-
idated text-based best practice guidelines may be developed and encoded into a decision
guidance and navigation system in the same way as GPS. Guidance and navigation systems
monitor the observations and produce timely suggestions according to the current state of
the patient based on the best practice guidelines.
We envision more medical guidance systems will be designed and adopted to assist physi-
cians or nurses in adhering best practice guidelines such as ACLS [83] for cardiac arrest,
algorithms for stroke [84] and protocols for sepsis treatments [85]. Especially when medicine
becomes more complex, the amounts of incoming patient information overwhelm an already
flooded environment.
For such life-critical medical CPHS, it is important to formally verify the design of the
system to ensure reliability and safety. In this way, we can detect and avoid the system design
flaws at an early stage. Within medical CPHS, there are a few research challenges to produce
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Figure 6.1: Interactions among humans, the CAR-GNSystem and medical device
computer guidance systems, and the inner best practice guidelines. First, a series of medical
related design objectives are needed when designing a medical CPHS. Second, an integrated
framework to systematically model the devices, best practice guidance, human behavior and
their interactions with the examination of the design objectives is also needed.
In this chapter, we focus on providing a set of medical human intellectual tasks as design
guidelines and an integrated modeling framework for main components contained in a med-
ical CPHS. Violations of the specified tasks may fall into the proposed human intellectual
task categories. The integrated modeling framework is based on timed automata and in-
cludes device models, human models, medical best practice models, and interaction models.
Our goal is to use UPPAAL [32] to examine whether the system prevents the medical errors
and meets the design requirements, and find out potential design improvement, based on
the human intellectual tasks driven verified properties and integrated system models. Our
main contributions include:
• Provide general human intellectual task categories as medical CPHS design guidelines.
• Provide an integrated modeling framework of a medical CPHS with devices, best prac-
tice guidelines, humans and especially their interactions in the loop.
• Provide a real case study of the cardiac arrest resuscitation guidance and navigation
medical CPHS.
Following this section, we present the background of the motivated medical CPHS example
in Section 6.2. We present the analysis of medical domain-specific objectives and human in-
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tellectual tasks in Section 6.3. The integrated modeling framework based on timed automata
and verified properties based on TCTL is described in Section 6.4. We present the timed
automata models and property verification of the cardiac arrest resuscitation guidance and
navigation medical CPHS as a case study in Section 6.5. The related work is described in
Section 6.6. We discuss the work in Section 6.7. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss
future work in Section 6.8.
6.2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we first present the cardiac arrest resuscitation and its best practice guide-
line as a motivation example of interactive medical system design. Then, we present the
Cardiac Arrest Resuscitation-Guidance and Navigation System (CAR-GNSystem) [78] as a
motivation example and the interactions between humans and machines.
6.2.1 Cardiac Arrest Resuscitation
Cardiac arrest is an abrupt stop of the blood circulation due to the failure of heart func-
tioning. It can be clinically classified as “shockable” and “non-shockable” according to the
patient’s heart rhythm. The shockable rhythms include Ventricular Fibrillation (VF) and
pulseless Ventricular Tachycardia (VT), and the non-shockable rhythms include Asystole
and Pulseless Electrical Activity (PEA).
American Heart Association published the Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) [83]
algorithm to train medical personnel to follow the best practice to operate the resuscitation.
This algorithm is widely used in hospitals. We briefly introduce the core of the ACLS algo-
rithm. The algorithm is divided by the rhythm shockable and non-shockable. Medical staff
will activate a defibrillator to deliver a therapeutic level of electrical shock that can correct
certain types of deadly irregular heartbeats, according to the guidance of the algorithm. On
shockable rhythms, VF/VT, first shock the patient and give the Epinephrine. If the rhythm
remains shockable, then shock the patient again and give Amiodarone. On the other hand,
if the rhythm is not shockable, give Epinephrine and recheck the patient’s status. If the
patient has Return Of Spontaneous Circulation (ROSC), it represents that the patient has
no cardiac arrest and the ACLS procedure ends.
We translate ACLS best practice workflow into computerized pseudocode in Algorithm 6.1
and then build a time automata of this algorithm in UPPAAL. As mentioned earlier, the
algorithm is divided by the rhythm shockable at Line 5 and not shockable at Line 23.
On shockable rhythm, VF and VT, Epinephrine is given for the first time. If the rhythm
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4 shockable = checkRhythmShockable()
5 if shockable == true then
6
7 Shock patient
8 CPR 2 minutes
9 shockable = checkRhythmShockable()
10 if shockable == true then
11 Shock patient
12 CPR 2 minutes
13 Give Epinephrine every 3-5 minutes
14 else
15 go to 38
16 shockable = checkRhythmShockable()
17 if shockable == true then
18 Shock patient
19 CPR 2 minutes
20 Give Amiodarone
21 go to 9
22 else
23 go to 38
24
25 else if shockable == false then
26 CPR 2 minutes
27 Give Epinephrine every 3-5 minutes
28 shockable = checkRhythmShockable()
29 if shockable == false then
30 CPR 2 minutes
31 else
32 go to 11 or 18
33 shockable = checkRhythmShockable()
34 if shockable == false then
35 go to 38
36 else
37 go to 11 or 18
38 if ReturnOfSpontaneousCirculation == false then
39 go to 26 or 30
40 else if ReturnOfSpontaneousCirculation == true then
41 go to Post Cardiac Arrest Care
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remains VF/VT, then give Amiodarone. On non-shockable rhythm, Asystole and PEA,
Epinephrine is given for the first time and no shock is delivered. If the patient has Return
Of Spontaneous Circulation (ROSC), it represents that the patient has no cardiac arrest and
the ACLS procedure ends in Line 41.
6.2.2 CAR-GNSystem
The CAR-GNSystem [78] is designed to assist physicians and nurses in adhering the
best practice guidance of ACLS. The CAR-GNSystem is composed of three major software
components and two tablets. The architecture of the system can be applied to other medical
domains such as stroke [84] and sepsis [86]. We will discuss the generality of the guidance
and navigation system in the discussion in Section 6.7.
Table 6.1: Main components of the CAR-GNSystem
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Workflow manager provides the
guideline as the reference to the SADP.
The hardware and software components in the CAR-GNSystem are depicted in Table 6.1.
The three software programs are the Medical Order Program (MOP), Workflow Manager
Program (WFMP), and Situation Awareness Display Program (SADP). The two tablets are
Medical Order Tablet (MOTablet) and Situation Awareness Tablet (SATablet). The MOP
runs on the MOTablet, and both WFMP and SADP run on the SATablet. In a ward, the
SATablet is wired/wirelessly connected to the TV screen. We refer the TV screen as the
situation awareness display and use both terms interchangeably in the following section.
When the patient has a cardiac arrest, a head nurse is in charge of operating MOTablet to
record the medical orders and drug prescriptions given by the physician. The physician is
in charge of the cardiac arrest resuscitation. Medical orders are then transmitted from the
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MOTablet to the SATablet and presented on the TV screen.
6.2.3 Human-Machine-Device Interaction
Cardiac arrest resuscitation is a complex and life-critical scenario of medical CPHS to pro-
vide interactive medical. We need to understand the complex interactions among physicians,
nurses, the patient, CAR-GNSystem and related medical devices.
Figure 6.1 depicts the complex interactions among physicians, nurses, the patient, the
CAR-GNSystem and medical devices. The CAR-GNSystem is circled by the outer dash
line, and composed of the SATablet and MOTablet. Both SADP and WFMP run on SAT-
ablet. Only MOP runs on MOTablet. MOP communicates with SADP through the wireless
network. The CAR-GNSystem has two interfaces for users. One is on SADP for the whole
medical staff to provide the situation awareness, and the other is on MOP dedicated for
the head nurse to read current status and input medical orders. SADP outputs integrated
information on the situation awareness display. All physicians and nurses can read the in-
formation on the TV to get the latest patient status. This design enables the medical staff
to be on the same page during the dynamic changing situations. MOP directly displays
the information on MOTablet. It is needed to mention that WMP does not provide a user
interface; instead, it serves as the workflow reference and checker for SADP.
Medical devices such as ECG are directly attached to the patient, and physicians and
nurses directly operate the CPR to the patient. Then, the CAR-GNSystem retrieves the
vital signals from the peripheral interface of the medical devices. To simplify the interaction
without loss of generality, we assume that only one doctor is in charge of the CPR and one
head nurse is recording the orders from the doctor.
6.3 CPHS DESIGN OBJECTIVES
Potential medical errors prevention and mitigation during interactive healthcare is one
of the most important objectives of designing a best practice guidance CPHS. To clarify
the objectives of the system, we must examine the possible human tasks that may lead to
potential medical errors. We present the common human intellect tasks and the tasks related
design guidelines for medical guidance and navigation CPHS.
6.3.1 Human Intellectual Tasks
One key factor in designing a CPHS is to mitigate the potential errors caused by humans.
An error is defined by a task violates adhering the best practice guidance. To have a better
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classification of the human tasks, we empirically provide the following five categories of
human intellectual tasks. Each category has some previous research in psychology, human
factors, and system engineering research. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
previous research on how to unify these types of task categories and use it as a guidance for
CPHS design.
Category 6.1 Recall Knowledge
Example: If the medical personnel doubts the next statement, then it could lead to
potential medical errors due to uncertain decision making.
Category 6.2 Amount of Information to be Integrated
Example: In the ward, there are multiple devices connected to the patient, it relies on
a human to read from different sensors and displays. It is possible that the medical
staff mixed use of the wrong readings from multiple devices.
Category 6.3 Insufficient Information to Make Decision
Example: When a physician wants to stop the CPR, he/she may not remember the
start time of CPR. So, he/she may not operate CPR to reach the goal time.
Category 6.4 Mental Calculations
Example: Assume that physicians give Epinephrine before, he/she needs to calculate
the next appropriate time to give another dosage.
Category 6.5 Attention Management
Example: In the ward, when physicians order to shock a patient, the rhythm may
change at the moment when the defibrillator is ready to shock. Hence, the shock can
be delivered in the unshockable rhythm.
In Category 6.1, medical staff usually memorizes the knowledge to provide treatments
to the patient. Research work [87] shows that, although medical staff practices the best
practice for cardiac arrest resuscitation, due to its urgent and infrequency on a daily basis,
medical staff may be panic at the situation. Hence, medical staff may not recall the correct
knowledge immediately. In Category 6.2, nowadays, more and more medical devices are
placed in wards to provide the information to assist in making a decision. However, these
devices provide an extra dimension of information for a human to process [88]. Medical
staff such as physicians and nurses can miss read, miss interpret, or mixed-use the provided
information to make a decision. Without information integration, humans solely rely on
their mental efforts to fuse the information from multiple sources.
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In Category 6.3, the medical staff relies on the information of the patient to make a
decision. The information could be the patient’s past allergy history from a longer time
frame or the given drugs in the past 10 minutes from a shorter time frame. Paper-based
history record has been used for a long time. However, medical information might not
be recorded properly due to the tedious and error-prone of handwriting. In Category 6.4,
medical staff needs to calculate some information such as the timing of drug use. The
calculation might be wrong in an intense environment such as an Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
In Category 6.5, this is because a medical environment is dynamically changing. When
medical treatment is ready to give, the condition of the patient could change.
6.3.2 Task Driven Design
Not performing the intellectual tasks that were intended to be accomplished could lead
to medical errors which further leads to medical failures to the patient [87]. Due to the
nature of the dynamically changing medical environment, medical errors vary depending
on the medical scenario and the environment. Without the assistance of a best practice
guidance system, the mentioned human intellectual tasks could lead to potential medical
errors in such dynamic environments with high probability. The design of a CPHS needs to
help to prevent those errors during medical practice. Let us take the CAR-GNSystem as an
example.
Task Related Medical Errors: Based on our previous work [78], we derive the fol-
lowing partial tasks for cardiac arrest resuscitation and match them to the proposed human
intellectual task categories. Failure of each task could lead to medical errors.
Task 6.1 Rhythm changes
If the rhythm of the patient changes, the treatment according to ACLS should be
changed.
Task 6.2 CPR temporal requirement
CPR progress should be no less than 2 minutes.
Task 6.3 Shock at the right moment
By the time that medical staff is ready to shock the patient, the rhythm should be
shockable.
For Task 6.1, this error could happen due to the urgent environment and emotion panic
[87], and hence belongs to Category 6.1 and Category 6.3. For Task 6.2, currently, it relies
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on manually counting the CPR progress and hence belongs to Category 6.2 and Category
6.4. Task 6.3 belongs to Category 6.5.
Table 6.2: Partial tasks assisted by the CAR-GNSystem
Tasks Task Category Software Programs
Task 6.1 Category 6.1 and 6.3 Workflow Manager Program, Situation Awareness
Display Program
Task 6.2 Category 6.2 and 6.4 Situation Awareness Display Program
Task 6.3 Category 6.5 Medical Order Program, Situation Awareness Dis-
play Program
Task Driven Design of the CAR-GNSystem: The CAR-GNSystem is designed to
help preventlf medical errors. Table 6.2 describes the proposed tasks that can be assisted by
the CAR-GNSystem. To prevent failure of Task 6.1, the CAR-GNSystem provides displayed
workflow for medical staff to reference the next step according to the ACLS algorithm. To
assist Task 6.2, originally, the CAR-GNSystem is designed to flash the user interface of
the CPR process once it reaches the goal of ideal CPR performed time. We will explain
the detail of design in Section 6.5. To prevent the failure of Task 6.3, the medical staff
in charge of shock should check the patient again before the shock. However, the current
CAR-GNSystem cannot guarantee the success of Task 6.3. This is due to the ECG monitor
does not interact with the defibrillator. This task can be done by the interlock mechanisms
of the ECG monitor and defibrillator.
6.4 SYSTEM MODELING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the integrated modeling framework for medical workflow guid-
ance and navigation CPHS. We first present the main model architecture and elements.
Then, we use a detailed case study on the CAR-GNSystem to demonstrate how to build a
comprehensive formal model for CPHS according to the guidance of our framework.
6.4.1 Modeling Framework
As presented in Figure 6.1, a guidance and navigation CPHS usually contains physicians,
nurses, a patient, related medical devices. The CAR-GNSystem consists of two software
controlled tablets and complex interactions among those elements. To hierarchically and
modularly model those elements, we first separate the scenario as human models and system













Figure 6.2: CPHS modeling framework
The system models may include but not limited to the platform models, peripheral device
models and network models for communication, where the platform models incorporate the
software modules such as ACLS management software and the hardware modules such as
tablets together. In human models, especially for the physician and nurse, we incorporate
the task models and interaction models. Task models represent the decision processes for
tasks intended to be performed by a human. Interaction models are the interfaces that
humans interact with other humans, platforms or devices in a system.
6.4.1.1 Human Models
We use the task models to represent decision-making processes and performed actions for
physicians and nurses, and use the interaction models to represent their interactions with a
guidance system and other devices. Both of the two kinds of models are modeled as timed
automata.
Interaction Models: Borrowing the concept of sender and receiver pattern that is ap-
plied to legacy communication of devices, we model the interactions between humans using
the same sender and receiver pattern. For the communication that needs to receive the re-
sponse to proceed, we treat it as synchronous communication. On the other hand, a medical
practice can also proceed without the response, and we model it as asynchronous communi-
cation. For example, during the cardiac arrest resuscitation, the physician is operating CPR
on the patient and wants to order Epinephrine to restore the patient’s heart rhythm. Even
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the physician may not hear the acknowledgment from the head nurse who is in charge of
recording the procedure, the physician still proceeds the operation to give Epinephrine to
the patient.
Our current human interaction models include vision, speech, and hearing models. In the
natural perceptions of a human, we treat the vision as an active behavior. It means that a
human can actively watch the object without the notification or acknowledgment from the
object. For example, a doctor can consciously and actively read the heart rhythm from the
ECG machine. Although, in real life human interactions, eye contact can be used to serves as
implicit communication. However, we do not aim to model this behavior. One can imagine
that in the medical scenario such as in surgery or cardiac arrest resuscitation, physicians
and nurses heavily rely on the verbal communication which is an explicit communication
and can avoid ambiguity and potential human errors. We also model speech and hearing as
a communication channel. The speech of one person serves as a sender and the hearing of
the other person serves as a receiver. Examples of interaction models for vision, speaking
and hearing are presented in Figure 6.3. We will return shortly to introduce Figure 6.3 in




Figure 6.3: Three types of human communication modeled in UPPAAL
Task Models: Task models represent the human decision-making process when some
conditions enable. For example, the cardiac arrest resuscitation algorithm described in
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ACLS is a decision-making process for dealing with a patient under different circumstances.
A single human model may have multiple task models depending on the complexity of the
decision process. In medical scenarios, there are different guidelines to help physicians and
nurses to get the best practice result in a patient such as algorithms in ACLS [83] for cardiac
arrest, algorithms for stroke [84] and protocols for sepsis treatments [85, 89, 86]. Physicians
follow these medical guidelines, algorithms, protocols to deliver medical practice to patients.
We can model the decision-making process of physicians based on these guidelines.
6.4.1.2 System Models
System models include platform, peripheral device, and network models.
Platform Models: The platform model is defined as the models with the software and
the host hardware. For example, in the CAR-GNSystem, one platform model contains the
MOTablet model and the MOP model. For software modules, developers can reference the
user interfaces and the functional procedures of the program. The user interfaces provide
ways that human models can interact with the running software. For instance, after the
interaction model of the physician sends inputs to the MOP model, the MOP model will
transmit the medical orders to the situation awareness display module through the network
model. For computer hardware, since we assume target software running on the commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware such as personal computers or tablets, developers have no
control over the design of the hardware. Developers can only model the critical status of the
hardware such as whether a failure presents or not.
Peripheral Device and Network Models: Peripheral device models are the models
for the devices that connect to the system of interest. For example, in the CAR-GNSystem,
the ECG device is one of the peripheral devices that connect to the SATablet and attaches to
the patient. Again, if peripheral devices are commercial-off-the-shelf devices, developers may
not have knowledge inside the black box. Hence, we only model the minimal and essential
functions of the peripheral devices. We model the network communication as channels of
senders and receivers, as presented in the following section.
6.4.1.3 Integrated Model Communication
The parallel composition operator (ch!, ch?) defined on the channel ch allows interleaving
of actions as well as handshaking synchronization of timed automata. We use these channels
to simulate the communication for both network communication of system models and in-
teraction models of human models. The input action ch? represents receiving an event from
the channel ch, while the output action ch! stands for sending an event on the channel ch.
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In human models, each human may have up to three communication models for vision,
speech, and hearing in the current design. For each communication model depicted in
Figure 6.3, there are three transitions between a wait node and a perception node, with
different communication channels attached to transitions. There can be multiple perception
nodes connected to the wait node to wait for synchronization. In Figure 6.3a, the top edge
is a perception edge from the wait node to the perception node. This edge receives the
synchronization from human task models. The middle transition from the perception node
transits to the wait node. The edge serves as the error of the perception. Here, the error
edge is saved for the use of communication failure. For example, the error edge in the vision
interaction model can be that a physician does not read the vital signs at the specific moment.
The third edge from the top is the action edge. An action edge is actual actions after the
perception node is triggered. For example, in the vision interaction model, the action edge
can be used to update local knowledge for future decision making. The knowledge may be
the number of performed CPR count or the number of drug usage.
Similarly, we incorporate communication into the speech and hearing. The speech and
hearing serve as a pair of a sender and a receiver in the communication. When a human
task model, Alice, sends a synchronization to the perception edge of the speech node, the
action edge sends the synchronization to the hearing model of the human task model, Bob.
After the perception edge of the hearing node of Bob is triggered, the action edge can
send the synchronization to the task model of human Bob or update local knowledge. We
incorporate these two operators into models of different elements for their communications.
Then, a device model may fire a transition separately, or synchronize with another human
model with the channel action ch! and ch? attached to their transitions. In this way, the
system models and human models are linked together.
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  Cardiac	  Arrest	  Resuscitation	  with	  Guidance	  and	  Navigation	  System	  
Human	  ModelsSystem	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• Medical	  Orders	  Program
• Medical	  Orders	  Network
• Situation	  Awareness	  Program












Figure 6.4: Hierarchical models of the CAR-GNSystem
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6.4.2 Integrated Models of the CAR-GNSystem
We use the CAR-GNSystem mentioned in Section 6.2.2 as the case study for the integrated
modeling framework for CPHS. Figure 6.4 presents all integrated models of the displayed in
Figure 6.1.
6.4.2.1 System Models of the CAR-GNSystem
In the system models, the subsystems include MOP, SADP, WFMP, an ECG monitor,
and a network. Also, for each subsystem, it has two dedicated network models. One is
used to receive a request from subsystems and send a notification to the channel of other
subsystems. The other is used to receive notifications from other subsystems. MOP records
the input from the head nurse and communicates with SADP. SADP references the medical
workflow from WFMP and displays the situation awareness. SADP and MOP communicate
through the wireless network model.
Figure 6.5: The Medical Order Program model in UPPAAL
More specifically, SADP is composed of a few sub-models. The sub-models include the
CPR progress model, the Epinephrine progress model, the Amiodarone progress model,
the shock model, and the rhythm model. The CPR progress model serves as a timer of
performing CPR to reach the CPR goal time. Typically, the CPR goal time is two minutes
according to the ACLS guideline. Epinephrine and Amiodarone progress models record the
given unit(s) of each medicine and the time elapsed since last given. According to the ACLS
guideline, Epinephrine should be given 1 mg every 3-5 minutes. Amiodarone should be given
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in 300 mg bolus at the first dose and 150 at the second dose. The shock model records the
given shock count. The rhythm model reads input from the ECG monitor model. Currently,
the ECG monitor simulates rhythm changing of the patient. We didn’t incorporate the
patient model in the current models. We believe the current framework is sufficient to verify
the medial errors caused by humans. Also, we are aware of incorporating the patient models
into our proposed framework can be used to facilitate medical knowledge.
Figure 6.6: Partial model of Workflow Manager in UPPAAL
Taking the medical order program model in Figure 6.5 as an example, it takes the input
from the head nurse and wirelessly transmits to SADP through the network, with a sequence
of committed states 1. Then, we present the partial workflow manager model in Figure 6.6
due to limited space. We incorporate ACLS adult cardiac arrest resuscitation algorithm into
the workflow manager and provide an interface to be referenced by the SADP model. The
displayed workflow can be mapped to the state 5 in the original ACLS adult cardiac arrest
resuscitation algorithm [83] or Line 5 to Line 13 in Algorithm 6.1.
6.4.2.2 Human Models of the CAR-GNSystem
For human models, we build the task models, the vision models and the speech models
for a physician, and build the task model and the hearing model for a nurse. Here, without
1Using committed states in UPPAAL reduces the state space significantly
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loss of generality and to simplify the models, we model only one physician to perform CPR
and one nurse to operate the CPR progress recording. In this scenario, the physician reads
the medical information from the situation awareness display and speak to the nurse to give
the medical orders. Due to the limited space, we only present the figure of the nurse model.
Figure 6.7: The nurse task model in UPPAAL
The nurse model is presented in Figure 6.7. When the nurse hears the medical orders
from the physician, the hearing model sends synchronization to the MOP model to record
the orders. For example, when the physician says “check rhythms”. The physician model
triggers the “SpeakCheckRhythm” channel. After the hearing model of the nurse received the
synchronization by “SpeakCheckRhythm?”, the hearing model then triggers the “Record-
CheckRhythm” channel in the nurse model. Later in the nurse model, it will also input the
rhythm to the medical order program model. We use the communication nodes for human
in Figure 6.3.
6.5 DESIGN EVALUATION ON THE INTEGRATED MODELS
The objective of the integrated CPHS models is to help examine whether potential medi-
cal errors can be mitigated by the design of the medical CPHS. We use UPPAAL to check
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the properties on the integrated models. For comparisons, we conduct two types of experi-
ments. In the control group, there are only the physician model and the rhythm model. In
the experimental group, the physician and nurse models interact with the CAR-GNSystem
models. Both experiments have the same rhythm inputs for consistency. In Table 6.3, each
verified property represents that if the property is satisfied in the UPPAAL verification, then
the relative medical error is mitigated.
For Task 6.1, our goal is to verify that the physician model only delivers a shock to the
patient when the patient has rhythm VF/VT. The physician model in the control group
performs the resuscitation without the CAR-GNSystem, it is not able to describe the prop-
erty of Task 6.1 just on the physician model without other accompanied model. In the
experimental group, the physician model delivers a shock to the patient when the rhythm is
shockable. The nurse model records the shock delivery in the MOP model. Hence, the in-
variant of Task 6.1 is that if the shock order is given, the patient rhythm must be shockable.
The experimental group satisfies the property of Task 6.1 as described below:
A[] MedicalOrder == ShockPatient imply
(V FV T == true && AsysPEA == false)
(6.1)
For Task 6.2, we verify that the time for performing CPR should not be less than two
minutes. In the control group, after the physician model starts CPR, the physician model
performs CPR for the approximate amount of CPR goal time. The ability to calculate the
ongoing CPR progress solely relies on human efforts. The property is not satisfied due to the
possibility of finishing earlier. For the scenario with the CAR-GNSystem, once the physician
model starts the CPR, the head nurse model records the action in the MOP model. The
CAR-GNSystem starts a two minutes timer. In the original design, when the timer expired,
the CAR-GNSystem flashes the user interface of the CPR Progress bar to notify the medical
staff. However, this approach requires some human attention. During the resuscitation, the
situation is urgent, relying on human actively monitoring the situation may not be possible.
Hence, we redesign the notification mechanism and change from visual notification which is
passively waiting to be seen, to sound notification which can actively notify the medical staff.
With the redesigned CAR-GNSystem, when the timer expired, the system sounds an alarm
to notify the medical personnel. After the physician model receives the sound notification,
it stops the CPR progress. With active sound alarm notifications, the experimental group
satisfies the property of Task 6.2 as described below:
A[] physician.CPRStop imply
(CPRProgress >= CPRGoalT ime)
(6.2)
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For Task 6.3, our goal is to verify that the possibility of faulty shock is not performed. In
the experiment scenario, the patient first remains at a normal rhythm and then has cardiac
arrest with rhythm Asystole/PEA (non-shockable). For the control group, the physician
model is uncertain whether to shock or not. Hence, the control group does not satisfy the
invariant of Task 6.3. For the experimental group, if the physician model doubts whether
to shock the patient, the physician model reads the suggested next move in the workflow
manager of the situation awareness display. The physician model with the CAR-GNSystem
satisfies the property of Task 6.3 as described below:
A[] not physician.FaultyShock (6.3)
From the above evaluations, it is reasonable for us to draw the conclusion that the medical
errors related to human intellectual tasks can be described and verified on the proposed
integrated models. If the errors are not mitigated during the verification of the models of
the system design, we can redesign the system and verify the updated models again. In this
way, potential errors will be avoided at an early stage.
6.6 RELATED WORK
One significant design consideration in CPHS is that the system should not cause an
error and need to mitigate the errors caused by interactions with humans as specified in
the requirements. Preventing errors is always an important topic in many areas such as
aviation and healthcare. Research work in aviation [90] and medication [91, 87, 92] reveal
the potential errors in different circumstances. The research [92] suggests that most of
the severe medical errors happen in medical ordering and execution of given treatment. It
shows that the rate of serious errors is 149.7 per 1000 patient-days. A medical best practice
guidance and navigation system can assist physicians and nurses in reducing the possibilities
of medical errors [78].
Formal modeling techniques can be applied to simulate the actual systems and examine
whether the system improves the user experience, causes errors or prevents errors due to
human-automation. Our previous work [93] uses a formal technique to examine the treatment
Table 6.3: Verified properties of Cardiac Arrest Resuscitation with the CAR-GNSystem
Tasks Verify without the system Verify with the system
Task 6.1 unverifiable satisfied
Task 6.2 unsatisfied satisfied
Task 6.3 unsatisfied satisfied
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validation protocol in the given medical orders. The research work [94] uses a model-driven
approach to prove the design on of infusion pump and relevant safety requirements. The
work [95] provides a methodology for detecting design errors and whether the system provides
necessary information to operators. The research work [96] proposes an interactive system
design framework based on Petri nets. Based on the given safety requirements and system
design, the framework helps to integrate the models. Based on the research work, we provide
guidelines for finding the safety requirements and support of verification on requirements.
There are numerous researches focusing on modeling human behaviors [97, 98, 99]. The
GOMS model is widely used in HCI to disassemble the tasks into goals, operators, methods
and selection rules. It can precisely model the very detailed steps of each action. The work
[98] has a similar approach to GOMS model. It provides formalism to model human behav-
iors. A task can be decomposed into many sub-tasks. The decomposition stops when the
task cannot be broken anymore. A human task then becomes a serialized small tasks. The
paper [99] proposes the extended operator function model (EOFM) based on the operator
function model. EOFM is an XML-based descriptive language to model human behaviors.
To use these human models with the system models, one needs to design the unified formal-
ism for validation. We can incorporate those human modeling techniques into our integrated
modeling framework.
There are also a few research works about the methodology for verification of human inter-
action and system design [33, 34]. The paper [100] gives a few mode confusion patterns and
examines the potential mode confusion of flight guidance systems. The work [33] focuses on
reusing the medical devices model. The paper takes the layers approach to model the system
and interactions. Our work has similar advantages on the reuse of modeling. The research
work [34], based on the extended operator function model (EOFM), provides a framework to
model the human-machine interactions. The work provides an automatic translation from
EOFM to Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [35] and verifies the specified properties with
SAL. The work [101] uses the task models based on User Action Notation, a task modeling
formalism, and system models based on Interactive Cooperative Objects (ICO) formalism
to build the integrated system. The research work [102] proposes a design framework based
on ICO. They suggest that using modeling of a system, human and interaction can facili-
tate the software development process during the early state. Those frameworks work well
in their domain, but to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first research work fo-
cusing on using human intellectual tasks as design guidance, and providing an integrated
model of medical guidance and navigation CPHS with a human in the loop to prevent po-
tential medical errors. In addition, we provide a unified communication pattern to model
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network communication between device models, communication between humans to system
and humans to humans.
6.7 DISCUSSION
The framework integrates device models, human models, best practice models, and inter-
action models as comprehensive modeling of a CPHS. Although it captures more features of
CPHS compared to previous works in the modeling level, there are still a few improvements
need to be discussed.
With the advancement in Cyber-Physical Systems, more and more computer-aided medical
systems will be designed to provide interactive healthcare. We choose the CAR-GNSystem as
a motivation example of such medical CPHS. Cardiac arrest resuscitation is a representative
case in terms of its urgency and safety requirements. It should be handled in a timely manner
with high confidence. Similarly, stroke and sepsis have stringent temporal requirements and
could lead to death. Medical guidance and navigation systems for various domains can assist
medical personnel in making better judgments and improving patients’ health.
We propose Human Intellectual Tasks based on the existing research, medical cases, and
our classification. Each category has related literature. However, these individual tasks are
not considered within the scope of medical cyber-physical systems. Based on the proposed
human intellectual tasks, developers can examine the domain-specific tasks and design and
examine the proposed system to mitigate the potential errors.
Although we provide a framework to construct medical CPHS models in UPPAAL, how
to validate the correctness of each model relative to the medical scenario is still an open
problem in research communities. We do not intend to model every interaction, device, and
system into details. Instead, we aim to model the abstract behaviors and logic of humans
and systems. From the experiments, the abstraction level indicates the feasibility of our
approach. One possible method to validate the model is to compare the models with the
implemented system. However, this approach is not feasible during the modeling phase.
The current patient model is simulated as an automaton that may randomly react to the
treatment. Since our goal of the integrated modeling is to assist in verifying the mitigation
of proposed domain-specific medical errors, the current patient model is sufficient for our
verification purpose. Modeling a patient may need further understanding of the human
body, especially the reaction of each treatment. An improvement of the patient model can
support more domain-specific errors related to the patient. Research work on human organ
automata [103] can help to facilitate the modeling framework in the future.
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6.8 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We present the general human intellectual task categories as medical CPHS design guide-
lines and an integrated modeling framework for medical guidance and navigation CPHS.
The major contribution is provide an integrated modeling framework for a medical CPHS.
The modeling framework includes software models, device models, network models, human
task models, and human interaction models. The modeling framework provides a guideline
to construct a set of system models and examine whether the system design models mitigate
human intellectual tasks related to medical errors through formal verification. We provide a
case study on the Cardiac Arrest Resuscitation-Guidance and Navigation System. The case
includes human-to-human and human-to-device interactions. The experiments of verification
based on UPPAAL show that the usability of our framework and also the CAR-GNSystem
mitigates the potential medical errors during the cardiac arrest resuscitation.
One potential improvement is to integrate the proposed framework with safety and reli-
ability research. Right now, we did not include a mechanism that deals with the system
failure detected through our framework. Existing research work [51, 104, 2] on open-loop
safety research can be further studied and integrated into this framework. Parts of this
chapter are published in the research papers [37, 36].
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
We have discussed each work in the three themes including (1) System Design for Net-
worked Medical CPHS, (2) Safety-driven Requirement and Software Traceability, and (3)
System and Human Behavior Modeling.
In (1) System Design for Networked Medical CPHS, we have discussed the open-loop safe
systems and a communication middleware based on pathophysiology. For the work of open-
loop safe systems in Chapter 2, we discussed how to find a series of state transition that
can counter against the network failures or supervisory computer failures. We provide a
case study on a laser tracheotomy system. For the work of Moss communication middleware
in Chapter 3, we have discussed how Statechart models and peripheral software programs
communicate and how to protect the exchanged medical data in a Statechart simulation
environment from unintentional modifications. We also demonstrate that middleware scaled
well with different message sized and can be used in the simulation environment without
significant performance degradation.
In (2) Safety-driven Requirement and Software Traceability, we have discussed the works
of SafeTrace and the Trapas traceability framework for distributed systems. For the work
of SafeTrace, we demonstrate how to set up traceability among requirements, system design
models, and safety analysis. We also demonstrate a tool implementation and provide a use
case of SafeTrace on an open-loop safe system. For the work of Trapas traceability frame-
work, we show how to build traceability of information flow for Pub/Sub-based distributed
systems. We also present various graph representations to organize publishers, subscribers,
exchanged topics, impacts caused by a change, and information flow.
In (3) System and Human Behavior Modeling and Verification, we present Human Intel-
lectual Tasks in Chapter 6 that extract from common medical errors, and the tasks can be
used as verification rules for modeling medical guidance systems.
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APPENDIX A: USER FEEDBACK OF USING TRAPAS
We collect user feedback of using Trapas from the experienced researchers and software
engineers working on the Sepsis guidance systems development. Particularly, we want to
single out our collaborators, Dr. Maryam Rahmaniheris and Miss Shuang Song. They
both provide valuable feedback and suggestions to the Trapas framework. Overall, they
acknowledge the usefulness and effectiveness of Trapas. In addition, in comparison with
manual tracing, they confirm that by using the projected IFG in Trapas it is much easier to
trace the information flows, the subscribers and publishers of a topic, and the topics that an
entity interact with.
During collecting user feedback, Dr. Rahmaniheris also mentions a few medical use cases.
We summarize types of changes including Create, Update, and Remove that we discovered
during the trial use of the tool. First, in a new definition of sepsis diagnosis, we use a qSOFA
(Quick SOFA) Score for sepsis which the score was not already used in the system. This
Create change introduces a new topic named Sepsis.qSOFA. A new entity named qSOFA re-
gion in a Statechart model to calculate the qSOFA score. As such, the qSOFA region acts as
a publisher to the Sepsis.qSOFA topic. Furthermore, to calculate qSOFA, the qSOFA region
needs to subscribe to the four topics including PatinetCondition.isInICU, PatinetCondi-
tion.isAlteredMentation, Respiratory.RespiratoryRate, and Cardiovascular.BloodPressure.
Then, we add the new topic, new Statechart region, publishers, and subscribers to the Pub-
/Sub configuration file. Lastly, we generate an updated traceability graph based on the
updated configuration file.
Secondly, we are given a new medical requirement that use Urine Output to evaluate the
patient response to fluid during sepsis resuscitation. Before the new requirement, the Kidney
region in a Statechart model is the only subscriber to the Urine Output topic. With the new
requirement, a Fluid region should be a new subscriber to the Urine Output topic. As such,
we need to update the subscribers in the subscriber attribute value in the Urine Output
topic in the configuration file. Next, we use the updated configuration file to update the
traceability graph and IFG.
Third, removing a topic can cause an entity to become disconnected in a traceability
graph. For example, originally, the Kidney region publishes the Kidney.RenalSOFA topic
and the Kidney region is the only publisher to the topic. The Sepsis region is a subscriber to
the topic. To shorten the time to diagnose the sepsis, the new requirement suggests not using
the Renal SOFA for diagnosis. As such, we need to remove the Kidney.RenalSOFA topic
from the configuration file. After removing Kidney.RenalSOFA topic, the Kidney region
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becomes disconnected from the traceability graph. As mentioned earlier, there should be
no isolated entity in a traceability graph. As a result, we need to also remove the Kidney
region from the configuration file and remove it from the Statechart model as needed.
Song raised a question regarding the extensibility of Trapas during the trial use of the tool.
Currently, Trapas supports monitoring a fixed set of attributes of each topic as specified in
a configuration file for Pub/Sub communication software. The question is whether Trapas
can support monitoring additional attributes of each topic in the future. To address the
question, we provide a workflow to adding the support of additional attributes for the future
development of Trapas.
Add the attribute to the 
Pub-Sub configuration file
A user adds a new attribute type of a topic
Check if a Pub-Sub 
middleware (ex: 
Moss) supports the 
new attribute?




Modify Trapas to monitor 
the new attribute
Generate the traceability 
graph based on the updated 
Pub-Sub configuration file
Perform CMTA and CITA 
based on the updated 
Traceability Graph
Modify the middleware to 





Figure A.1: The workflow to monitor a newly added attribute of a topic. The newly added
attribute can later be used in CMTA and CITA.
Figure A.1 shows the workflow to add a new attribute type of a topic. First, with the new
attribute type, we need to check whether the targeted communication middleware such as
Moss supports the new attribute type. If the middleware does not support it, we need to start
from modifying the middleware to support the new attribute type. Once the middleware
supports the new attribute type, we can then modify the configuration file for communication
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to include the new attribute type. Next, we need to check whether Trapas can monitor the
new attribute type and perform impact analysis on a value change of the new attribute
type. We need to modify Trapas if necessary. Once both the communication middleware
and Trapas support the new attribute type, we can then generate a traceability graph based
on the newly modified configuration file. Moreover, based on the updated traceability graph,
we can perform CMTA and CITA.
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